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Abstract 
Much has been said, often negatively, of the role of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank in the international system. Usually these criticisms focus on 
financial advice rooted in neoliberal ideology rather than in conditions within a given 
economy, or on the strict conditions attached to IMF or World Bank loans. The 
discussion of the role of these institutions often does not extend into the discussion of 
revolutions. This study seeks to draw connections between IMF or World Bank 
involvement in developing states and the revolutions that occurred within them. Using 
John Foran’s model for revolution in the Third World, the study aims to determine 
whether conditionality constitutes a “world-systemic opening”—a change in the 
international system that allows the structural inadequacies of a state to fall to the 
pressures of the society beneath it. This examination reaffirms the notion that revolutions 
are complex processes with roots in a state’s structures and its placement in the 
international system. The revolutionary consequences of IMF and World Bank 
involvement is not limited to conditionality, however; in the three situations studied, 
conditionality was limited, despite rules to the contrary. Throughout these revolutions, 
the work of the IMF and World Bank is pervasive, especially in economic policy 
advising and the extending of loans crucial to the survival of the old economic system. 
More often than not it is the withdrawal of funding due to political oppression or 
instability than it is conditionality that constitutes a world-systemic opening. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
For all their infamy, revolutions are relatively young social phenomena, arising 
alongside the development of the modern state in Europe—tradition clings to the 
eighteenth century overthrow of France’s Ancien Regime as the first instance. Since that 
time, states around the world—from China to Nicaragua, Mexico to Russia, Cuba to 
Angola—have undergone social revolutions of varying success.  
For sociologist Samuel Huntington, this recent development is no mere twist of fate. 
Rather, it is a result of the incredible strain modernization places on suddenly antiquated 
social and political structures. “Revolution is thus an aspect of modernization…an 
historically limited phenomenon…most likely to occur in societies which have 
experienced some social and economic development and where the processes of political 
modernization and political development have lagged behind”1 
Discerning the specific causes of revolutions, however, has proven a much more 
difficult task. Debate still rages among political theorists as to where the search for 
variables should begin. Some argue for a “structuralist” approach, citing a state’s internal 
form and placement in the international system as crucial starting points for investigation. 
Others push a “voluntarist” approach that holds up revolutionaries and the individuals in 
the masses—the people who comprise a revolution’s social makeup—as central to 
understanding how and why revolutions occur.2 
This paper, for reasons discussed in the second chapter, will take up the structuralist 
argument. Accordingly, it seeks to define those macro-level conditions that influence 
socio-political stability in increasingly exact terms. Employing the model of political 
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scientist John Foran for revolutions in developing states, it primarily seeks to address the 
role of institutions, specifically the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), in revolutions.3 
Specifically, Foran’s model defines two steps where it seems reasonable for the 
involvement of these Bretton Woods Institutions to influence revolutionary outcomes. 
Third world revolutions occur in societies experiencing widespread dependent 
development under exclusionist or oppressive regimes. Yet this is not enough, Foran 
maintains, to guarantee revolutionary conditions will arise.4 Rather, society must have 
“political cultures of opposition,” systems unique to a given society which revolutionaries 
employ to mobilize support.5 When the state undergoes an economic depression followed 
by a change in its normal placement in the international system, these political cultures of 
opposition assist in the formation of coalitions and the explosion of a revolution.6 Using 
Foran’s framework, this paper investigates whether World Bank or IMF involvement 
constitute such a “world-systemic change,” which Foran specifically defines as a “let up 
of external controls.”7 The World Bank, the IMF, and the conditions imposed by both are 
the exact opposite; their arrival constitutes a build up of external involvement and—given 
their advantageous position when dealing with countries in financial crisis—influence.  
Revolutionary Theory 
John Foran presents the evolution of revolutionary theory as a four-step 
development of socio-political thought. The first generation, he argues, merely described 
how specific revolutions occurred rather than why. Unfulfilled by this explanation, the 
next generation of revolutionary theorists went after the “why and when” of their subject, 
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often reverting to psychological or functional explanations of group behavior. The upshot 
of this focus on society and the groups within it was an emphasis on agency—what a 
group of people could and actually did do—in various processes of revolution.8 
Like rebellious children, however, the next generation rejected much of the 
second’s analysis. This group rejected conclusions drawn from a particular revolution for 
yielding information far to event-specific to draw useful, overarching conclusions. 
Barrington Moore, Jr., one of this generation’s best known scholars, pioneered the 
“structural” school, arguing that a complex relationship of social, political, and economic 
dynamics—not individual action—lies at the heart of every revolution.9 
Moore’s important step forward drastically changed the analysis of revolutions. In 
1979 it led to Theda Skocpol’s well-crafted definition of revolutions in her States and 
Social Revolutions: “Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s 
state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-
based revolts from below… this definition makes successful sociopolitical 
transformation—actual change of state and class structures—part of the specification of 
what is to be called a social revolution.”10 The power of this definition lies in its ability to 
eliminate political revolutions, rebellions, insurrections, and coup d’états from the 
discussion of what is a highly unique phenomenon. 
By continuing the tradition of structural critique, Skocpol centered discussion of 
her topic on the structure of the international system, the role of which could easily be 
investigated in numerous revolutions around the globe. From this, Foran’s “fourth 
generation” of theorists have worked to incorporate into the structuralist approach a 
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consciousness of agency, focusing on factors from racial diversity to cultural traditions or 
the role of gender.11 
This latest development is important because through it one can find common 
trends in a great spread of revolutions, while simultaneously including the important role 
of the individuals who compose the revolutionary masses. As such, Foran’s model of 
revolution in the developing world begins dependent development—characterized by 
foreign incursion into and development of a third world economy. It proceeds to the 
existence of an exclusionist or repressive regime alongside “cultures of political 
opposition” among the masses. Foran argues that, given these three conditions, an 
economic downturn followed by a let up of external influence will lead to a successful 
revolution. Foran’s model is crucial to this study because, aside from providing a 
framework by which revolutions can be identified and examined properly, it allows for 
the two NGOs in question to play a part in social revolutions.12 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
As one of the products of the 1944 United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference (Bretton Woods), the World Bank was “created to channel investment in 
projects within countries in need of reconstruction and development,”13 which from that 
time on “was defined as the promotion of economic growth.”14 Likewise, its sister 
organization, the International Monetary Fund originally was “charged with ensuring a 
stable international monetary system that would foster equitable growth” while also 
monitoring exchange rate policies and offering loans “to members encountering balance 
of payment problems.”15 
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While opinions differ regarding the degree to which each organization met these 
responsibilities in their first thirty years, the collapse of the fixed exchange rate Bretton 
Woods system in 1973 led to an identity crisis in the IMF, necessitating some change of 
purpose if the institution were to retain its influence. This transformation came from 
within. Drawing from Section I of its Articles of Agreement, the IMF turned its focus to 
on correcting balance of payment (BOP) issues.16 Thus, by the late 1970s both the World 
Bank and the IMF were “engaged in leveraging loans to ensure a jointly defined project 
of policy reform in borrowing countries” in addition to the project lending offered by the 
Bank.17 
The institutions, however, have been the targets of heavy criticism. Many, like 
Canadian economist Michel Chossudovsky, label them as means of increasing the 
influence of Western political and corporate interests. His criticisms range from World 
Bank tax policies—which he argues cripples small agricultural and industrial interests at 
the expense of large international firms—to its sudden trade liberalizations, claiming they 
make credit too costly for small farmers.18 Along with Chossudovsky, Graham Bird 
questions the prevalence of forced depreciations in countries taking loans from the IMF 
to end BOP deficits; both men argue that these actions lower the real wage of laborers—
which Bird fears could “spark off political unrest.”19 Such moves have clear implications 
for revolutionary movements. Similarly, Adam Przeworski and J.R. Vreeland find reason 
to believe that “participation in IMF programs reduces growth while a country remains 
under and has no effect once a country leaves.”20 In light of the vast socio-political 
changes involved in adhering to IMF conditionality, it does not seem outside the realm of 
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possibility for this failure to grow to add to the strength of cultures of political opposition 
while also crippling the credibility and cohesiveness of the state. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Through a general examination of World Bank and IMF behavior and via detailed 
case studies, this work will investigate whether the implementation of these two 
organizations’ policies serves as a revolution-conducive change in the international 
system. The following chapter examines the tradition and existing literature on 
revolutionary theory and studies of the Bretton Woods Institutions, along with a 
justification for the role of non-governmental organizations within the international 
system. Chapters three through five provide detailed examinations of the rise of 
revolutionary situations in Nicaragua, South Africa, and Nepal under various programs 
and policies enacted or encouraged by the World Bank or IMF. 
Revolutions are significant not in and of themselves, but rather because, as socio-
political processes, they deeply affect the lives of innumerable individuals. The vast 
resources available to the IMF and World Bank bestow their actions with as powerful a 
reach. The case studies on Nepal, South Africa, and Nicaragua confirm the accuracy of 
John Foran’s model of third world revolution, while the importance of the involvement of 
the IMF and World Bank in these countries remains dubious.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Any study of the role of institutions in revolutionary processes first must address 
three factors: the long-established yet continually evolving theory of social revolution, 
the claim that institutions hold a position of influence in a state-oriented international 
system, and the role and behavior of the specific institutions themselves. The 
performance of such an examination allows for the identification of causal linkages 
between the practices of the institutions and the theory. These perspectives provide 
variables by which the search for the influence these organizations wield in the socio-
political arena might be conducted.  
This chapter does just this. First, it demonstrates how the process of 
understanding social revolutions has changed over the past century to allow multiple 
avenues for this influence to be known. It then will argue for the importance of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in the international framework, with an aim at 
solidifying the claim that establishments like the IMF can, and do, maintain an important, 
powerful place among states. Finally, it highlights how certain purposes, failures, and 
programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) tailor these 
organizations to foster revolutionary situations in the developing world. 
Revolutionary Theory 
 Revolutions are inherently complex social and political processes. Despite their 
identification with certain dates—July 14, 1789 or October 1917 are forever tied with the 
French and Russian Revolutions, respectively—they are not solitary events but a long 
chain of them, characterized by the interaction of innumerable variables. It follows that 
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the study of revolutions is a struggle, one marked by a need to sift through countless 
factors and to settle on those most crucial to the understanding of why revolutions occur.  
The Evolution of Revolutionary Theory 
John Foran characterizes the development of the theory of revolution as a 
movement through four generations. Each step is marked by transition: particular 
shortcomings in the previous generation become the near-obsessive focus of the 
successive one. Yet none of these stages constitutes a paradigm shift. Instead of a drastic 
change of direction, each succeeding generation built upon the work of the past. Thus, 
rather than a stepwise process of new and independent ideas, modern revolutionary 
theory is an amalgamation of critical thought. 
Early revolutionary theory in actuality was no more than a simple retelling of 
how, rather than why, revolutions occur. Left with this rather unperceptive tradition, 
“second generation” scholars sought “to explain why and when revolutions arise, using 
either social psychology or structural-functional approaches to collective behavior.”1 Of 
these approaches, Theda Skocpol highlights “political-conflict theorists,” who maintained 
the importance of group organizational capacity over surface assumptions of popular 
outrage. Even when this capacity exists, the state “may successfully repress the will to 
engage in collective action by making the costs too high to bear.”2 In light of this, a 
cutback of government capability should have, in environments where social unrest 
already exists, positive effects on revolutionary processes. This carries important 
implications for countries where IMF or World Bank support is conditional on fiscal 
contraction. 
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Skocpol also discusses the importance of what she calls “systems/value 
consensus” theorists, most notably Chalmers Johnson. According to Johnson, the social 
system cannot come into the crisis necessary to spark a revolutionary movement unless 
“values and environment become seriously ‘dis-synchronized,’ due to either external or 
internal intrusions, especially of new values or technologies.”3 From early in the 
tradition, theory allows for a powerful external entity to enter into a state’s socio-political 
structure and, through polices foreign to that state, to reconfigure it. “Once dis-
synchronization sets in, people in the society become disoriented, and thus open to 
conversion to the alternative values proposed by a revolutionary movement.”4 
Given the second generation’s intense focus on the micro-characteristics of 
revolutionary societies, one can view the third generation as an attempt to attach 
overarching themes, rather than location-specific details, to the understanding of 
revolutions. Ranging from “the state, dominant elites, and armies, to international 
pressures and peasant mobilization,” these structural variables translate the events of 
individual revolutions into common details that allow researchers to investigate root 
causes.5 
Barrington Moore, Jr. often receives credit as the father of the structurally focused 
third generation, pioneering the approach in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy. In his studies of the English and French Revolutions, Moore finds that—
more than the speeches of Danton or the writings of Locke—changes in each state’s place 
in the world economy and their desire for growth determine the arrival of a revolutionary 
environment.6 Often, this focus centers on the overthrow of an antiquated feudalist 
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system, replaced “with a new social and political order, at once simple and more 
uniform.”7 
While perhaps hidden in the shadow of Moore’s accomplishment in Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Samuel Huntington offers an invaluable 
conceptual discussion of social revolutions in chapter five of his Political Order in 
Changing Societies. Huntington begins with a cutting definition of revolution as “rapid, 
fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, 
in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and 
policies.”8 While this list seems to focus on innumerably micro-level conditions, 
Huntington leaves no doubts as to the role “institutional factors” will play in his 
analysis.9 Revolutions result from the process of modernization. As a state’s economic 
and societal needs evolve, they run the risk of outstripping the development of its 
political and economic systems. At a certain point, this imbalance must lead to a crisis of 
the state, as new systems crash down upon the old ones.10 Such processes suggest a 
dynamic by which the conditions set by international finance institutions (IFIs) might 
induce revolutionary situations. In societies marked by constancy, shock therapy reforms 
seem to run this risk. Far outside the control of revolutionaries themselves, state and 
international structure set the terms of revolution. 
For Foran, however—and for the purposes of this paper—this generation’s 
greatest contribution to the literature is Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions. 
“Reacting to theories that relied too much on revolutionaries’ conscious control of 
events,” Skocpol sought to bring structure, specifically the role of the international 
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system, into the debate.11 “Unique to social revolution is that basic changes in social 
structure and political structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing fashion.”12 
From this standpoint, Skocpol lays out her definition of social revolution: “rapid, 
basic transformation of a society’s state and class structures…accompanied and in part 
carried through by class-based revolts from below.”13 What makes this definition so 
useful is its simplicity. Unlike Huntington, Skocpol lists only two necessary changes: 
class and government. Two significant consequences of Skocpol’s definition hold special 
importance for this study. The first is that a class-based revolt that does not effect lasting 
structural change cannot be considered a revolution but instead a rebellion. The second 
concerns political revolutions, which involve the reconstruction of the state while leaving 
social structures relatively intact; they also, Skocpol claims, need not result from inter-
class struggle.14 These two seemingly minor details are hugely important in ensuring that 
the selected cases fit the model of revolution chosen to examine the role played by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions in developing states. 
Structure v. Agency 
Ultimately, Skocpol’s unbending structuralism inspired a theoretical 
counterrevolution. The basic idea that structures, the result of individual humans 
combining to form social networks, alone decided the arrival of revolutions ran counter to 
the intuition of many. “Social scientists often miss…the fervour and anger that drives 
revolutionaries and makes them into what they are…At the very centre of revolution lies 
an upheaval of moral indignation…with the powers that be.”15 This new generation 
focuses on the inclusion of “the interrelated issues of agency, political culture and 
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coalitions, and the dimensions of ethnicity…class, and gender.”16 The division of where 
the line should be drawn, where structure and agency should meet, lies at the heart of the 
modern literature of revolutionary theory. 
Structuralists, like Skocpol and Moore, echo Wendell Phillips’ famous maxim: 
“revolutions are not made; they come.”17 Skocpol’s own work centers this approach on 
international structures and world-historical developments.18 This argument allows for an 
investigation of IFIs because, among other responsibilities, they possess the ability to 
change the linkages between the international economy and the state or society 
themselves. 
Theorists who argue that revolutions, as social phenomenon, must be born of the 
agency of individuals, fall into the “purposive,” or “voluntarist,” approach. Best 
characterized by the writings of Eric Selbin, this school of thought rejects the structuralist 
assumption “that structural conditions dictate absolutely what people can do.”19 Selbin, in 
fact, argues for the importance of what Foran calls “cultures of political opposition”: a 
population’s cultural traditions which allow for the building of “strategies of action” 
aimed at addressing issues in their society.20 Both Selbin and Foran advocate for the 
ability of these strategies to be exploited by revolutionaries to mobilize others to their 
cause. 
Nonetheless, the voluntarist claim that “human actors are not simply ‘carriers of 
structures’ but also ‘generators of them’” is ultimately unbalanced.21 While room must be 
made for arguments that include the human elements of politics and society, the fact 
remains that, in a worldwide system, structures simply outsize the small groups at the 
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core of revolutions. As a result, the ensuing study of the role of these IFIs on revolutions 
will take a structuralist stance that acknowledges pertinent micro-level variables. 
Foran’s Model for Revolution in the Third World 
 A proper, if brief, understanding of the development of revolutionary theory and the 
structure-agency debate are necessary for understanding the implications of John Foran’s 
contributions to this investigation of the role of World Bank and IMF programs in 
revolutions. Foran adopts Skocpol’s definition of revolution as his own. “The salience of 
these three factors—political change, structural transformation, and mass participation”—
in her definition allows the organizations three avenues of influence.22 The focus on 
international structures and changes to them reverberates in Foran’s analyses.  
In Taking Power, Foran presents his model for revolutions in the developing 
world—the model of revolution employed in the ensuing following case studies. Defining 
“success” in a revolution as “coming to power and holding it long enough to initiate a 
process of deep structural transformation,”23 Foran adds to Skocpol’s definition by 
providing a framework for a “complete” revolution, if such a thing exits.24 The most 
convincing contribution he brings to the literature, however, is his introduction of 
voluntarist critiques into his structuralist model. Presenting his model as intrinsically 
economic, and thus well suited for this investigation of the revolutionary potential of 
IFIs, he practically develops a fifth generation of theory. As such, he seeks to determine 
“the relationship among” individuals, culture, states, “and political economy” instead of 
overemphasizing singular all-encompassing variables.25  
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Foran’s model sets its focus on revolutionary events in the developing world. Of 
primary essence is the role of development in the formation of the Third World. Replying 
not only on the inner workings of the state itself, development also revolves around “a 
country’s historical insertion into the world economy”; in the Third World, this 
development “significantly shapes its social structure.”26 This allows for organizations 
like IFIs to play a highly influential role in a poorer, weaker society’s social structures. 
Unsurprisingly, Foran’s model begins with the phenomenon of dependent 
development, a process of “growth within limits” which fosters “social and economic 
grievances among diverse sectors of the population.” However, since “some Third World 
countries actually do develop in aggregate terms” despite their disadvantaged position, 
simply staring at GDP growth statistics should not unveil potential hotbeds of revolution. 
On the contrary, such growth is “generally accompanied by negative repercussions for 
specific groups or classes,” which becomes “the principle cause of the grievances of the 
classes and groups that participate in revolutionary coalitions.”27 Furthermore, this 
suggests that, while IMF and World Bank policies actually might achieve their own aims, 
they still might lead to instability. Whether or not they do does not depend solely on 
growth, but also where such growth successfully takes root. 
Vietnam following World War Two offers a brutal picture of dependent 
development and its ability to inspire the mass mobilization Foran describes. Conquered 
by Japan in 1940, Vietnam became “a virtual accessory to the Japanese war effort.”28 The 
costs of this development, built upon the exploitative system of French colonialism, 
became clear in 1945. Exacerbated by the war and huge exports of rice by the Japanese, 
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“‘hundreds of thousands of people starved beside granaries of rice kept full by the 
Japanese and French.’”29 
Foran’s next qualifier is the existence of a repressive or exclusionist state. He 
includes this because a system like dependent development requires “a repressive state to 
guarantee order in a rapidly changing setting where much of the population is suffering.” 
This differs from a democracy, which must ultimately take its mandates from popular 
vote. Oligarchies, like the fourteen families of 1980s El Salvador, and dictatorships, like 
the Somoza dynasty of Nicaragua, exclude the personal involvement of the majority in 
the activity of the state. Accordingly, they instigate indignation among the unprivileged 
while providing a specific target for overthrow.31 
With these two structures—one based in the international system, the other in the 
state itself—in place, Foran introduces his voluntarist variable: political cultures of 
opposition, “the diverse and complex value systems existing among various groups and 
classes which are drawn upon to make sense of the structural changes going on around 
them.” Citing the work of Eric Selbin for his inclusion of a voluntarist argument in a 
predominantly structural model, Foran admits that the delegitimization of the state—
which begins under structures of exclusionism and dependent development—provides 
opposition groups building blocks for organized mobilization.31 
While this paper intends to explore the effect the World Bank and the IMF have 
on fostering cultures of political opposition, the primary focus of this work is their role in 
Foran’s final variable: the sequence of economic downturn and “world-systemic 
opening.” Pointing out the crippling effects an economic downturn can have on state 
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capability, Foran also indicates their nearly universal presence in successful cases. Once 
on the ropes of the world economy, developing countries must rely even more heavily on 
their relationships with core economies. This leaves the state further at risk of falling 
victim to the international system. “A world-systemic opening may occur when…this 
‘normal’ situation is disrupted…This let-up of external controls adds to the crisis of the 
state and creates an opening” for revolutionaries to seize power.32 
The following case studies seek, in essence, to expand this definition of world-
systemic openings. Foran insists they comprise a lessening of foreign involvement in the 
country in question. World Bank and IMF participation in a specific country, however, 
ultimately amounts to an increase in foreign involvement; consequentially, Foran’s 
argument leaves their behavior out of the discussion of revolutionary situations. The 
majority of World Bank and IMF agreements are the result of economic downturns in a 
state. It is counterintuitive to exclude such integral changes in the international system—
the extension of crucial loans or development projects—from the discussion of changes 
in the world system. Foran also defines world-systemic changes by their disruption of the 
“normal situation” within the state. The case studies argue that, because the policies of 
these two IFIs change the status quo, implementation of them constitutes world-systemic 
change. 
Foran’s model, replicated in Figure 1 above, accurately depicts revolutions as a 
process. Originating from a state’s position in the international system, the model 
progresses through political structure and social capacity, and considers various 
amplifiers of state crises. Foran insists that a social revolution must present all five of 
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Figure 1.1: Foran’s Model of Social Revolutions in the Developing World 33 
 
these variables meet his definition of success.34 Thus, each of the following case studies 
will first ensure that all five steps in the model occur, as a means of doubly ensuring 
social revolutions are the subject of this analysis. 
“Crises that have launched social revolutions have not at all been epiphenomenal 
reflections of societal strains or class contradictions,” but the “direct expressions of 
contradictions centered in the structures of old-regime states.”35 In echoing Huntington’s 
view of revolution as a process of modernization, Skocpol rejects the ability of a single 
variable to trigger revolution. Quite the opposite, she argues that various failures of the 
state to adapt to the circumstances imposed on it by suddenly antiquated international and 
societal structures fulfill this role. This requires the consideration not only of the 
individual crises that arise, for instance, due to state fiscal cutbacks, but also of those 
structures in that state that pre-destined it for economic failure, political instability, and 
the intervention of IFIs. Foran’s model allows a proven format by which this undertaking 
can succeed. 
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Can NGOs Really Influence States? 
 Despite the discussion above, there exists no consensus that international 
institutions can have real influence on the behavior of states. Even Skocpol and Foran, 
when discussing international structures or events, turn almost exclusively to the actions 
of other states, e.g. foreign interventions or embargoes. This fits into the traditional 
school of international relations: Realism. Here, the most important international actors 
are states, and they rationally act to ensure their own survival, which is their main 
concern.  States seek to ensure their survival through power in an anarchic international 
system that lacks any legitimate governing body.36 
 John Mearsheimer is modern Realism’s loudest voice. He rejects the notion that 
institutions like the UN can serve as world powers, maintaining that states can choose 
whether or not to follow these groups’ rules.37 On the subject of the IMF and World 
Bank, Ngaire Woods confirms with this assessment by referencing “the record of failed 
conditionality” in Fund and Bank agreements: “borrowing governments seldom actually 
do as they are told.”38 In Mearsheimer’s view, “institutions largely mirror the distribution 
of power in the” international system, leaving them as tools by which more powerful 
states can exert their strength.39 While this criticism has been specifically directed at the 
IMF and World Bank, arguing this does not limit the reach the institutions themselves 
have. 
 Indeed, for institutions as integral to the functioning of the world economy as the 
IMF and World Bank, discrediting their role seems an act of obstinacy. Liberal 
institutionalism, a newer school of international relations, emphasizes the complexity of 
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the international system, focusing especially on numerous interconnections between 
states and the societies under them.40 Whereas Realism assumes a highly anarchic system 
where security is a chief concern and military strength crucial, “states act in accordance 
with liberal institutionalism when the threat of aggressive war is low.”41 Within this 
framework, Robert Keohane describes the modern world system in the following terms: 
“to analyze world politics in the 1990s is to discuss international institutions: the rules 
that govern elements of world politics and the organizations that help implement those 
rules.”42 This explicit acknowledgement of the importance of institutions encourages this 
study to continue into a discussion of the institutions in question, with a hope of 
discerning specific mechanisms to examine in the subsequent case studies. 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
In 1944, in the shadow of World War II, representatives from 44 nations arrived 
at the United Nations Monetary and Finance Conference in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire. Their goal was to develop a framework for the proper functioning of the 
international monetary system following the anticipated Allied victory. While also noted 
for the establishment of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), by far the 
most important products of the “Bretton Woods Conference” were two organizations 
designed to help organize, protect, and develop the international economic system: the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the 
International Monetary Fund.43 
Purposes of the World Bank and the IMF 
Moving beyond general aims of development and stability, proper understanding 
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of the Bretton Woods Institutions and their programs begins with their individual Articles 
of Agreement. Amended numerous times since 1944, these documents outline the 
structure, organization, and purposes of the Bank and Fund in extreme detail.  
The World Bank’s creation aimed “to channel investment in projects within 
countries in need of reconstruction and development,”44 especially projects too large or 
risky to be undertaken by private investors.45 Yet “development” is an amorphous 
concept. It can entail the building of schools to expand the intellectual capital of a society 
and the personal growth of individuals. It also can mean the elevation of standards of 
living. Economist Amartya Sen advocates another interpretation: “expansion of freedom 
is…both (1) the primary end and (2) the principal means of development.”46 
“From early on” at the World Bank, however, development “was defined as the 
promotion of economic growth.”47 Woods stakes this claim to Article I.i of the World 
Bank’s Articles of Agreement, which includes as an intention of the Bank the 
“development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for 
productive purposes.”48 The Bank’s approach in its early years had it provide loans for 
the development of large-scale public infrastructure, such as port facilities. This “need for 
industrialization” as a prerequisite to growth-focused investment suggests a means by 
which early World Bank involvement might have encouraged revolutionary situations. A 
higher degree of infrastructure increases the ability of ideas, people, and supplies to move 
across geography and society. In unison with the strains a move toward sudden 
industrialization can put on the socio-political structures of a country, this dynamic helps 
explain the historical record of revolution in industrializing states. 
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 Outside of the economic growth of borrowing states, the drafters of the Bank’s 
Articles of Agreement included a commitment to “promote the long-range balanced 
growth of international trade” while also protecting its members by giving “due regard to 
the effect of international investment on business conditions.”49 The balance the Bank has 
struck between its obligations to the domestic economies of its members and the 
development of the world economic system as a whole lies at the center of many critiques 
aimed its way. This criticism has grown over the past few decades, as the Bank turned 
from its “large public infrastructure loans toward a broader range of projects,” the result 
of a shift in its concept of development. Woods describes this change as a move to “de 
jure conditionality,” when Bank managers began to sense a role in development for “the 
overall policy framework and institutions within the borrowing countries.”50 
Originally “charged with ensuring a stable international monetary system that 
would foster equitable growth,” the IMF was established to monitor the exchange rate 
policies of its members, especially through the direct lending to members short on 
reserves.51 Among its listed purposes in its own Articles of Agreement are the promotion 
of “international monetary cooperation through…consultation and collaboration on 
international monetary problems” and “exchange stability.”52 With the growth and 
stability of the mechanisms which balance the world economy at the forefront of its 
responsibilities, the IMF was crucial to increasing the level of economic 
interconnectedness between member states.  
This initial vision for the IMF was not to last long. In 1973, the United States 
went off the gold standard, shattering the decades-old system of dollar-pegged exchange 
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rates. This, however, rendered the contemporary inception of the IMF superfluous. 
Seeking a new mission by which it could remain relevant, the Fund returned to Article I. 
Although doing so no longer upheld a world monetary system based on fixed rates, the 
Fund set its sights on the maintenance of its members’ balance of payments. “Fulfilling 
this function the IMF transformed itself from a currency regulating institution” to a 
servicer of debt “involved in the policies of much of the third world.”53 
As a result of the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, the 
modern inceptions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund experience a 
high degree of overlap in activity. Woods characterizes this new system as one in which 
both IFIs “are engaged in leveraging loans to ensure a jointly defined project of policy 
reform in borrowing countries on top of which the World Bank undertakes project 
lending.”54 Increasing its involvement in the fight against poverty, the IMF unveiled its 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999. The new program intends to 
make “the objectives of poverty reduction and growth more central” to IMF lending 
programs.55 
Criticisms and Shortcomings 
If only due to their prominence among NGOs and the scale of their operations, 
both the World Bank and IMF are targets of much criticism. The literature includes a 
preponderance of criticism toward the IMF. This may be due to the Fund’s role as a 
lender of last resort during financial crises, when much is at stake for the borrowing 
country. In comparison, the focus of the World Bank on developmental programs makes 
its interventions less risky than bold charges into the guns of fiscal collapse. 
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Many of the broadsides aimed at the Bretton Woods Institutions focus on their 
lackluster “success” rate. Such premature attacks forget, however, the original purpose of 
the institutions. “They are public, universal agencies for a reason. Missing from the 
critics’ view is the fact that the Fund and Bank exist in large part to go where angels fear 
to tread…If they enjoyed a 100 percent success rate and return on every loan, we would 
have to ask why public institutions were needed” in the first place.56 Despite their many 
admitted shortcomings, the Bank and the Fund invest in some very risky places and 
projects. Thus the success or failure of their programs might not be to bad economics or 
even bad policies, but simply unwinnable starting conditions on the ground. The very 
nature of their investments means outcomes are, to a certain degree, ambiguous. 
Another blanket attack levied against both institutions targets their motivations. 
Many accuse the organizations of being subservient to the interests of developed states or 
even large corporations—not the purposes listed in either organization’s Articles of 
Agreement. Canadian economist Michel Chossudovsky, an outspoken critic of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, cites the example of Korea following the East Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997. The IMF’s plan came out only “after high-level consultations 
with the World’s largest commercial and merchant banks.”57 
Chossudovsky also stands out as one of the loudest voices against the policies of 
the World Bank. On the topic of their loans and conditions, he decries what he sees as 
exploitative tax laws, which fall on “small agricultural producers and units of the 
informal urban sector.” While these local entities, presumably limited in their resources, 
“are subjective to government taxes, joint ventures and foreign capital invariably enjoy 
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generous tax holidays as a means of ‘attracting foreign investment.’” This dynamic is 
reinforced by increased interest on domestic credit; small agricultural and industrial 
interests cannot afford the high price tied to credit and are thus forced out of the way, 
Chossudovsky implies, of large foreign corporations.58 
Likewise, Chossudovsky blasts the World Bank Public Investment Program. 
Despite large sums of investment directed through World Bank to domestic programs, 
this rarely translates into equal amounts of capital in the developing country. 
Interestingly, Chossudovsky does not suggest the possible existence of corruption in the 
borrowing states. Rather, he describes a process in which international firms submit bids 
for contracts to public works projects. After these firms take money in the form of 
consulting fees for research, they subcontract construction to local companies that 
employ the lowest-wage labor. Therefore, “loan money earmarked for infrastructural 
projects is largely ‘recycled in favor of multinational contractors’” who have little need 
for the funds themselves.59 This implies less capital and thus slower than expected 
growth, given the sums of money being channeled “into” the country. 
On the subject of IMF programs, Adam Przeworski and James Vreeland are blunt: 
“International Monetary Fund programs are controversial.” While borrowing 
governments might argue that involvement with the Fund is necessary for growth, 
regardless of the costs, “general strikes, riots, and ransacking of supermarkets manifest 
that IMF programs mobilize popular resistance.”60 Indeed, the public outcry that IMF 
programs often spark should have a noticeable effect on revolutions, especially as a 
means of coalescing cultures of popular opposition into a unified front.  
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Przeworski and Vreeland’s research further suggests “the IMF is more likely to 
sign with dictatorships,” possibly “because they are easier to negotiate with.”61 Ngaire 
Woods backs this claim, arguing that such officials hold the authority required to enact 
the policies the IMF and World Bank need to succeed.62 This incorporates another 
variable of Foran’s into situations involving the Bretton Woods Institutions: the 
exclusionist state. Each of the case studies involves such a government: Nepal, a 
monarchy; Nicaragua prior to 1979, a dictatorship; and South Africa, an oligarchy under 
the apartheid rule of the National Party. According to Stephen Nelson, the repercussions 
of this trend toward non-democratic regimes vary depending on location. In Africa, 
Nelson argues, IMF involvement tends to encourage democracy, “while its effect in Latin 
America and East Asia is consistent with one of the complaints of its critics, which is that 
the IMF suppresses democracy.”63 
Even more serious is Przeworski and Vreeland’s conclusion that, “when matched 
for exogenous conditions, participation in IMF programs reduces growth while a country 
remains under and has no salutary effect once a country leaves.” They are left to conclude 
that countries which refuse IMF assistance—even those with large balance of payment 
deficits—grow at a higher rate than those that do.64 The implications of this finding for 
revolutionary processes are great. First, this implies that a country already in economic 
crisis will continue or worsen its economic standing by turning to the IMF for assistance. 
Additionally, the pain of fiscal contraction that often comes with large IMF packages 
limits the capability of the state to coerce any opposition that might gain a foothold 
during a long repression. 
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Vreeland and Przeworski’s findings leave many questions unanswered as to how 
the IMF might fail so massively to achieve any of its goals in troubled states. For Woods, 
the answer lies in the “professionalism” of both the Fund and the Bank. Woods uses this 
term to describe the fact that the vast majority of the organizations’ management and staff 
are trained in economics at North American universities.65 While this likely allows for a 
degree of efficiency within these IFIs by focusing solutions on a very specific toolbox, its 
downside is a lack of “local knowledge” in the programs enacted around a diverse globe. 
The reason for this comes down to the “messy, political, intractable, and very difficult to 
make judgments about” nature of local knowledge. Such details reek of inefficiency.66 
However, without it, governments enact policy reforms that might be wholly 
inappropriate for their particular situation. These reforms might inadvertently trigger 
political instability. If they do, one might argue that, in an extension of Huntington, 
revolutions themselves are movements toward economic development—enacting policies 
and programs tailored exactly for the people in question. This lack of local knowledge 
also increases the culpability of the World Bank and the Fund. While the two institutions 
definitely do take on highly risky loans, their ignorance clearly fails to help them 
minimize losses. Rather, they fall victim to a generalist approach that William Easterly 
describes disparagingly as “planning”: distant, uninvolved, and unaccountable.67 
Among the most criticized policies that the IMF relies upon in its attempts to 
boost economic growth and shrink deficits is devaluation. Much has been made of the 
potentially destabilizing effects currency depreciation can have on a developing 
economy, focusing on real wages and diversification. Given the fear that devaluation will 
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fail to translate into a depreciated real exchange rate because of inflation,68 “the IMF 
obliges the government…to adopt a so-called ‘anti-inflationary program’…which has 
little do with the real causes of inflation (i.e. the devaluation).”69 The Mundell-Flemming 
IS-LM-FX model shows that, with an endogenous depreciation of the domestic currency 
as advocated by the IMF, domestic interest rates must fall. Given these limitations on the 
money supply, this lower rate requires a fiscal contraction (a downward shift in the IS 
curve), usually accomplished through massive government spending cuts. Output 
declines and wages remain the same; with dollarization, the potential for a price rise 
increases; overall, the economy faces the threat of recession and lower real wages. Bird in 
particular notes the potential of these “income redistributive effects” to “spark off 
political unrest” in the borrowing country.70 
“Resulting from a desire to strengthen the tradeables sector of the economy and 
thereby to facilitate debt servicing,” devaluation is seen by many to be “an overambitious 
attempt to achieve stabilization and liberalization simultaneously.”71 Yet, by placing a 
heavy emphasis on the export sector of the economy, the IMF ignores a dangerous 
possibility. In their World Bank policy research paper, Elbadawi and Sambanis find that 
“economic diversification that would reduce a country’s reliance on primary exports” 
reduces the risk of political violence within that state.72 Given the IMF’s pursuit of 
policies that aim to build an export-heavy economic system, this claim suggests that such 
policies will contribute to instability and growing violence, both of which are traditional 
characteristics of revolutionary processes, indicative of mass mobilization and a crisis of 
the state. 
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Conditionality and Stability 
“The economic policies that Washington urges on the rest of the world may be 
summarized as…free-market capitalism.”73 Policy makers in Washington viewed poorer 
states’ inability to escape the poverty trap as a clear failure of managed markets. “After 
all, if one of the secrets of Western prosperity was the feedback and accountability of free 
markets, the most obvious thing the West could do to transform the rest was to introduce 
free markets.”74 For such a fundamental change could be accomplished cleanly—indeed, 
for it even could be attempted—would require a penalty for failure. Thus was born 
conditionality. A state could receive loans only if changes in its structure, most notably 
its markets, were made in return 
From the 1950s to the “late 1990s,” the IMF employed the Polak Model as “the 
foundation for IMF financial programming and conditionality.”75 This system, created by 
IMF economist Jacques Polak, presumed “that a country with balance of payments deficit 
was absorbing too many resources in consumption and investment, relative to what that 
country can produce.” Domestic credit was increasing too rapidly in these countries, 
which, given a constant money supply, resulted in a BOP deficit and a loss of reserves. 
This focus on domestic credit and reserves connected the economic policies of a 
government to the health of its BOP. This meant that, “to help resolve a balance of 
payments problem, the IMF would need to address domestic economic policy.”76 Even at 
their start, however, such policies of interference were criticized, most notably for their 
lack of local knowledge or concern.77 Capital controls were rejected as a means of 
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balancing payments largely on the insistence of the United States, which pushed for an 
international policy of capital account liberalization. 78 
Each member country pays into the Fund a “quota” based on the size of that 
country’s economy. On loans up to 25 percent of this quota, no special terms are 
required. Anything above the 25 percent threshold, however, necessitates an IMF 
agreement. This forces the borrowing state to embrace certain policies: loan conditions 
which “entail fiscal austerity (cutting government expenditures and increasing taxes), 
tight monetary policy (raising interest rates and reducing credit creation), and currency 
devaluations.”79 
Some countries may seek out conditionalities as a justification for imposing 
unpopular structural reforms or to pass blame for the implementation of such policies. 
For opposition groups to contest the policies in question “is no longer a rejection of the 
government, but a rejection of the IMF, which is costly because it sends a negative signal 
to creditors and investors.”80 If reforms are already unpopular in a society, establishing 
them anyway fosters certain aspects of cultures of political opposition. Additionally, 
opposition to these policies may have good reasoning behind their stance if the programs 
in question weaken a state with their drastic changes. 
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CHAPTER 3: NICARAGUA 
 
The overthrow of the Somoza family dynasty of Nicaragua by a multi-class 
coalition led by the Marxist-nationalist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 
1979 has inspired a large degree of study. The amount of interest in the Nicaraguan 
Revolution likely stems from the fact it took place in the backyard of the United States of 
America, under a family that had uniquely strong ties to the US government. These ties 
became a liability to Washington, however, when the Somoza family’s corruption and 
repressive behavior could no longer be ignored. Decades of unequal growth and 
government overinvestment in unstable sectors of the economy left the state vulnerable to 
the organized action of a disenfranchised population; as the economy’s struggles 
deepened, Nicaragua’s economic elites, seeking their own economic interests, shifted 
their support to the remarkably adaptive FSLN, forcing the balance of power away from 
Somoza. Conditionality seems to have had little role in the revolution; in fact, recent 
Nicaraguan participation in condition-heavy loan programs suggests no correlation 
between socio-political instability and loan requirements. The role of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions was still crucial, however. As the architect of the system of government-
driven agro-export, the World Bank allowed the Somozas to consolidate economic and, 
thus, political power. 
Dependent Development 
Despite their small size, “weak entrepreneurship, organizational fragmentation, 
and political incompetence” Nicaragua’s economic elites played an important role in 
linking the two sides of Nicaragua’s political economy for much of the twentieth century.  
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While their holdings placed them on top of the social structure, these elites were 
fractured, often along regional lines.1 Additionally, a surplus of sparsely populated land 
allowed for widespread use of subsistence farming. This labor-intensive, low-output form 
of agriculture regularly employed the majority of population in the working of 
community land rather than on the plantations of elites.2 Thus, through the first half of 
the twentieth century, Nicaragua faced a combination deeply entrenched agricultural 
practices and an ineffective elite; together, these propagated a largely non-industrial 
economy with little hope of reform. 
Even from these times, however, agricultural exports served as the source of 
growth for the Nicaraguan economy and of wealth for the nation’s economic elites. 
Driven by successes in Costa Rica, in the 1850s the Nicaraguan state began to encourage 
the widespread cultivation of coffee, building the Pacific port of Corinto in 1859 to 
manage coffee exports. By the onset of the great depression, coffee was responsible for 
over half, 54 percent, of the value of Nicaragua’s exports.3  
As years passed, the success of coffee exports began to entrench export 
agriculture as the backbone of the Nicaraguan economy. This transition was encouraged 
in a large part by the international financial institutions. IMF Advisors in 1949 
recommended “mechanizing agriculture and increasing the flow of capital to producers” 
as means of solving deflation, credit restrictions and slow growth through “the agro-
export sector.”4 Experts from the IFIs sought not only higher productivity from 
agriculture, but also more efficient means of transporting farm goods to urban processing 
or shipping facilities. As such, the World Bank funded projects to construct links between 
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farming regions and the Pacific Coast or Managua.5  
Export agriculture noticeably bolstered Nicaragua’s aggregate economy. Between 
1950 and 1977, average annual GDP growth was a remarkable 6 percent. Nonetheless, 
such accomplishments could not conceal that “clearly, many Nicaraguans were getting 
poorer as their country grew richer.” Childhood malnutrition shot upward, doubling 
between 1965 and 1976.6 The encouragement on the part of the IFIs for an export 
agriculture driven economy had dangerous consequences for Nicaragua’s socio-economic 
structures. Government policies in response to these recommendations benefited the 
economic elites who already controlled the means to grow, harvest, and ship export 
goods; their good fortune allowed them to expand their operations; yet as they purchased 
new land, they also widened income inequalities. Peasants found themselves forced from 
their homes to less fertile areas; their inability to subsist off this lower quality land sent a 
flow of the poor to plantations, where they “lived and worked…in miserable conditions 
during part of the year”7 or to the cities, where they settled in burgeoning slums.8 
Aggregate successes were going to the Somoza family and the economic elites, bypassing 
the lower classes whose dispossession had allowed for such rapid growth. 
The success of coffee soon expanded Nicaragua’s export agriculture sector to new 
crops. As fast food chains exploded in popularity in the United States, demand for cheap, 
lower quality beef grew immensely. This had a remarkable effect on the Nicaraguan 
cattle industry, as beef exports climbed from $3 million to $44.5 million in the thirteen 
years after 1960. This trend added to the agricultural land grab, and a tripling in the 
amount of land used in cattle production further contributed to the rising numbers of 
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homeless poor.9 
It was cotton, however, that quickly became the propelling force behind the 
Nicaraguan economy, as cotton farming became the primary destination for domestic 
credit. “In 1954, 68 percent of all credit was devoted to cotton, and acreage doubled with 
the infusion of a $7.5 million loan from the World Bank. By 1955, cotton overtook coffee 
as the top export.”10 Since World Bank loans were allocated through the state to cotton-
producers, the cotton industry’s rise depended heavily on the state. In fact, “by 1956, 
government financing covered between 70 and 80 percent of the total cost per acre,” 
creating “a pattern of short-term price speculation and reluctance to invest personal 
funds.” This left the government heavily invested in a highly speculated market that was 
extremely susceptible to failure from pestilence, tropical weather, and price instability in 
foreign markets.11 
Dependency went both ways; with the national bank as the majority provider of 
credit to cotton, cotton growers—and with them their financial strength—grew more and 
more reliant on the Somoza dictatorship.12 With such a large proportion of the elite 
dependent on the regime, the state was more empowered to act as it wished, without 
interference from elites. The potentially destabilizing consequences of this system first 
became obvious in 1957, when a drop in the price of cotton broke years of political peace 
and shook the foundations of the economic elite. Since a large number of cotton growers 
still had outstanding loans with the National Bank of Nicaragua (BNN) at the start of the 
planting season, the government quickly found itself stuck with a $7 million deficit.13 
Economic development in Nicaragua during the early to mid twentieth century 
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was not limited to agriculture. Following the Second World War, Nicaragua’s 
involvement in the world market deepened, and its economy diversified remarkably, 
“reinforced by the interventions of international financial and development authorities, 
particularly the World Bank.”14 The average annual growth rate of manufacturing grew at 
about 12 percent throughout the 1960s, a rate unmatched in the rest of Central America. 
By 1975, manufacturing controlled a small but important 22 percent of the economy, 
creating formerly unheard of opportunities for industrialists.15 
Despite these minor victories for non-governmental elites in this period, the 
growth of the economy benefited the Somoza family far and beyond any other group. By 
1979, “the family controlled economic assets which represented 25 per cent of GDP.” In 
comparison, the two large Nicaraguan “business groups,” composed of multiple 
economic elites, controlled only 20 percent of GDP.16 The rapid development of the 
economic system under the guidance of the World Bank granted the Somoza regime with 
the power to control elites through manipulation—threatened or real—of the economy.17 
The Nicaraguan economy of the mid-twentieth century also featured a heavy 
dependency on the United States. “The role assigned to Nicaragua by US capital, as a 
supplier of raw materials and a market for [US] manufactured goods, scarred the 
economy with every feature of dependency. Nicaragua relies on its exports…Its industry 
is grossly underdeveloped, unable to meet internal demand,” which US industry met in its 
stead.18 Additionally, “US-dominated institutions,” namely the World Bank and IMF, 
served as the primary gateway to resources crucial to economic development—further 
trapping Nicaragua and the rest of the region within the US sphere of influence.19 
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Eventually, the behavior of the Somoza regime necessitated Washington to place a freeze 
on US and US-backed aid to Nicaragua. Without economic support, Nicaragua’s 
economy teetered on the brink of collapse; with Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s lifeblood 
gone, he lost control of the economic elites, who shifted their support toward the 
Sandinistas in hopes of resurrecting their own fortunes.20 
Exclusionist State 
The Somoza family held a firm grip on the politics, economy, and society of 
Nicaragua from 1937 until its 1979 overthrow.21 Much of its power lay in its control of 
the National Guard, of which Anastasio Somoza Garcia, the patriarch of the dynasty, was 
appointed head in 1933. Complicit in the assassination of nationalist rebel and Somoza 
opponent Augusto César Sandino in 1934, the Guard’s monopoly of violence built it into 
a much-feared tool of repression.22 Over time, this violence became increasingly focused 
on the general population as well: on January 22, 1967, National Guard forces under the 
command of Anastasio Somoza himself attacked an unarmed political demonstration with 
disproportionate and deadly force, killing or wounding at least 600 protestors.23 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia’s rise to power employed the National Guard for his 
own aims. Having deposed President Sacasa, his wife’s uncle, in 1936—two years after 
ordering the murder of Sandino—Somoza’s ascent was one of intimidation and 
violence.31 Nonetheless, not all of the Somozas’ political consolidation was the result of 
guns and bloodshed; indeed, one of the biggest steps required Anastasio Somoza to strike 
a deal with members of the Conservative: “deference to Somoza…for one-third of the 
National Assembly and the promise of more commercial liberty.”32  
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With the National Guard as its fist, the Somoza family extended its reach into 
every facet of Nicaraguan life.24 More often than not the expansion of the Somoza 
family’s influence resulted in a contraction of that of the elite.25 The dynasty’s 
consolidation of power severely limited elites’ hereditary control over “traditional 
sources of wealth: sugar, coffee, and beef production.”26 To further this bid and to build 
something of a personality cult, the eldest Somoza built an image of himself as protector 
of the Nicaraguan nation; yet when he “staked the success of his administration on 
attracting foreign aid and expanding export agriculture,” he opened his government to 
claims of illegitimacy if its promises failed to match economic reality.27 
Corruption and a disproportionate control of wealth characterized the Somoza 
regime. Using a closely watched “bureaucratic network known as the ‘minifaldas,’” or 
“miniskirts,” the Somozas attempted to maintain their personalistic control over 
Nicaragua’s economy by directly overseeing the design of liberal economic programs. 
Trained in economics or business at Western universities, the minifaldas developed 
policies that, due to their neoliberal education, allowed for Nicaragua to receive aid and 
international financial favor. The illusion of like-mindedness between the IFIs and the 
minifaldas to some extent worked to cover the Somozas’ unconventional actions, 
providing a certain degree of freedom from “sources of pressure for socioeconomic 
reform” at home and abroad.28 
If the government’s procurement foreign aid displayed rank cronyism, its 
response to the 1972 Managua Earthquake was more akin to that of an invading army: 
“guardsmen, including Somoza’s own security detail, deserted their posts to attend to 
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their families or to devote themselves to looting, while ignoring victims’ pleas for help.” 
They then profited in the weeks that followed by selling their looted goods, along with 
relief supplies from abroad, on the black market.29 Such behavior aroused and 
consolidated opposition in groups traditionally loyal to the state, namely economic 
elites.30 
Cultures of Opposition 
The violently repressive nature of the Somoza regime led to the alienation and the 
ultimate organization of the economic elite. In 1979, as a credit crunch gripped Nicaragua 
amid political instability, growers had difficulty obtaining funds from the BNN, and “a 
large part of the early plantings were abandoned because of insufficient capital to renew 
the cotton cycle.”33 Following the massive losses from this crop failure, many elites 
chose to organize and make demands of the government. As political unrest exploded 
among the lower classes, the discontent of the nation’s economic elite provided the FSLN 
an opportunity to make their movement truly multi-class, while elite organization allowed 
revolutionaries a framework within which they could present their vision to those with 
economic power. 
This tradition of organized protest—rooted in outrage over the credit system—
would prove crucial in the coming revolution, although it does not appear that the IFI-
backed credit system itself was the predominant reason for elite dissatisfaction. 
“Interview data convey a clash of political and moral values between Somoza and the 
cotton elite, not one over export markets and profits.” Nonetheless, when elites moved to 
fight what they viewed as political and moral wrongs, they drew on the experience of 
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credit protests to guide their efforts.34 Additionally, such data ignores the negative 
correlation between the criminal activities of the Somoza regime and the state’s ability to 
secure foreign loans or investment. Since the state channeled loans from abroad to 
agricultural elites, any loss of funds caused by its repressive tactics would have critical 
economic repercussions for growers. Sandinista leadership recognized the alienating 
effect of over forty years of Somoza rule on the country; “they even saw the opportunity 
to draw disaffected businessmen into a broad anti-Somoza alliance.” By moderating their 
leftist rhetoric, they quickly gained much needed support from the disaffected upper 
class.35 
Nonetheless, the FSLN’s most powerful tool for framing their struggle against 
Somoza was the image of their namesake. Augusto Sandino was the leader of Liberal 
Party dissidents who, for six years, had waged guerilla war against US and US-allied 
Nicaraguan forces.36 With his murder at the hands of the Somoza’s US-backed National 
Guard, Sandino passed into the collective memory as an image of nationalist pride. “The 
revolutionaries’ use of the figure and persona of Sandino was central to their success.”37 
The hierarchy of his revolutionary ideals—advancement of the Nicaraguan nation and 
opposition to US imperialism38 over Marxist motivations—made him an approachable 
image for a multiclass coalition.39 
Economic Downturn 
Nicaragua’s turn to export agriculture did have a positive effect on the national 
economy; indeed, from 1961 until 1972, the economy grew every year and inflation 
remained in check. Nonetheless, prior to the Managua Earthquake of 1972, there had 
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been a trend of steady decline in annual GDP growth rates. With the end of the post-
earthquake construction boom of 1973 and 1974, the economy shrank minutely.40 
The corruption and violence by which the dictatorship had ruled soon came to 
bear on the economy’s ability to weather such difficulties. Under the Carter 
Administration, which claimed a foreign policy that put human rights first, funding to 
Nicaragua became less and less available. By 1979, White House had begun to block 
assistance from the IFIs; after one such loan for $20 million from the IMF had been 
 
Figure 3.1:  Nicaragua’s annual rates of inflation (GDP deflator) and GDP growth, 1961-1984.41 
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vetoed, the Nicaraguan “government defaulted on $65 million of external debt. Then, the 
Central Bank raised interest rates on outstanding loans in agriculture and sped up 
amortization on short- and medium-term credit.”42 The resulting “absence of liquidity and 
forthcoming capital from foreign lenders made it imperative for businessmen to wrest the 
banking system from the state.”43 The cease of credit fueled the already steady rise in 
joblessness, encouraging more of the industrial working class to support the coalition 
fronted by the FSLN.44 
 
World-Systemic Opening: IMF And World Bank Involvement 
World Bank involvement in Nicaragua began in the early 1950s in the form of 
advisements and missions. After one such mission cited the “weakness of the 
transportation and financial infrastructure of the country” as a major limitation to growth, 
the Bank encouraged the building of highways in the fertile western portion of the 
country. Through this and more blatant urgings for building the economy on agro-export, 
the World Bank took on a huge role in shaping the Nicaraguan economic and political 
climate. The Bank’s involvement had unexpected consequences when it offered a $3 
million loan “to set up the Ministries of Economy and Foreign Affairs.” The positions 
within these new institutions were immediately filled with Somoza cronies.45 Simply put, 
without direct oversight by the World Bank—and its ignorance of the real situation on the 
ground in Nicaragua—the creation of government jobs under its programs became yet 
another means for the Somozas to expand their power. 
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Nicaragua’s costly system of credit had its roots in World Bank advising. Having 
determined that not even 25 percent of Nicaragua’s cultivable land actually was being 
farmed, a Bank report emphasized “the need for an adequate credit system to strengthen 
producers’ ability to compete in export markets.”46 The disbursement of funds from the 
IFIs also had the unfortunate effect of magnifying the Somozas’ power, as all loans 
disbursed to Nicaragua “had to be deposited in either BNN or INFONAC [the National 
Development Institute] accounts controlled by Somoza”; this made the Somozas “the 
lifeline to official development assistance.”47 
As World Bank involvement continued into the early and mid-1970s, its loan 
activity seemingly moved to counter growing inequality. In its 1974 Annual Report, the 
Bank reported that “small- and medium-sized farmers,” those outside the large banking 
and business groups, would be the targets of its most recent batch of loans. The Central 
Bank of Nicaragua (BCN) was to disburse the loan, which again left vital credit in the 
hands of the Somoza regime. Furthermore, the loan’s aim was focused still primarily on 
export agriculture rather than on the economic independence of Nicaraguan food supply 
or the survival of the rural poor.48 
This effort to expand export-agriculture to small farmers could be seen as an 
attempt to curb the potential for socio-political instability, especially as growing numbers 
of landless farmers poured into Managua—fodder for FSLN revolutionaries. This 
suggests the World Bank might actively seek to minimize social instability even in the 
face of political and social injustice; from an investment standpoint, this makes much 
sense, as such actions would lower the risk factor for investors.  
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Unfortunately for such investors, around this time the Somoza regime itself began 
to lose economic credibility. Continued human rights violations tempted Carter 
Administration intervention, as its foreign policy claimed to be human-rights-centered. 
While the White House did end most international financial assistance to Nicaragua by 
1979, the ban was not absolute; these exceptions often benefitted US interests while 
hurting Nicaragua’s economic position. Notably, the IMF forced the BCN to devalue the 
córdoba 40 percent in April 1979. However, given the political climate, investment in 
planting was low and labor boycotts common; the sought-after rise in exports did not 
occur. What did happen was capital flight, as Nicaragua’s loans, and their interest 
payments, were valued in US dollars.49 
IFI planning and funding, rather than imposition of conditionality, ultimately 
crippled the Somozan state. This trend would arise again in the crippling of the 
Sandinista government, as the Reagan Administration cut off Nicaragua from 
international development funds, and most other trade and aid, during the 1980s.50 
Revolution 
“The Nicaraguan revolution was not peasant, proletarian, or bourgeois. People of 
almost every social stratum actively participated in the overthrow of the Somoza 
dictatorship.”51 FSLN attacks in 1977 marked the beginning of major armed conflict and 
quickly sparked investor worry over an imminent, “precipitated economic decline.”52 
Boycotts, strikes, and shutdowns intensified throughout August 1978,53 culminating in an 
uprising on September 9, 1978 that La Guardia put down viciously and violently, even 
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against non-combatants.54 Investor fears turned into reality, as war destroyed nearly 8 
percent of Nicaragua’s GDP in 1978.55 
The massacres in response to the September 9 uprising occurred throughout the 
countryside and marked the point of no return. Nine months later, on May 31, 1979, a 
broadcast went out calling for general revolt and strikes: “‘Heroic people of Nicaragua, 
the hour of the overthrow of the infamous dictatorship has come.’” The disenchanted 
masses—many the uprooted peasants turned slum and plantation dwellers—received the 
announcement with vigor. Their mobilization would play a “central role in challenging 
[the] anachronistic” Somoza regime.56 By June 9 the Battle of Managua had erupted, 
“involving citizens from nearly every social sector…traders, vendors, artisans, 
carpenters, bricklayers, mechanics, and students.”57 Popular support for the FSLN was so 
strong that, throughout the city, “barricades, trenches, and well-defended 
positions...appeared overnight as if by magic.”58 
After over two weeks of fighting in the city, FSLN forces retreated to the relative 
safety of Masaya.59 By saving thousands upon thousands of its forces from certain death 
at the hands of the technologically superior National Guard in the capital, and through the 
sheer improbability of the feat, the retreat amassed “awesome propaganda value.”60 
Indeed, the successes of the FSLN in and around Managua signaled to many elites that 
the time to abandon Somoza had arrived, and some open support of the FSLN began. By 
June 27, the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), in a final act of elite 
fracturing, recognized the Leadership Junta of the FSLN as the rightful government of 
Nicaragua.61 
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Lingering pockets of Somozan control soon fell to omnipresent FSLN pressure. 
With the fall of the conservative stronghold of Granada on July 17, Somoza retired from 
his position as commander of the National Guard and fled with his closest advisors to 
Florida. “Radio Sandino woke the nation on the morning of the 19th with martial music, 
folksongs, the Sandinista anthem and the slogans of victory. It broadcast the first 
instructions of the Junta, ordering discipline, vigilance, and generosity to the defeated 
enemy.”62 After decades of corrupt rule, exploitative governance, and unequal growth, 
the Somoza regime had collapsed under its own shortsighted policies and misbehavior.  
Cutoff Over Conditionality: The Collapse of the Sandinista Government 
The victory of the FSLN would not last the decade. The Sandinistas' 
predominantly Marxist, anti-United States rhetoric quickly made it unpopular with the 
Caribbean’s undisputed hegemon. Within months, despite Nicaragua being “an obvious 
candidate for reconstruction financing,” IFI assistance shriveled up.63 So effective was 
US influence that previously accepted IBRD loans to Nicaragua underwent cutbacks after 
US officials announced their “displeasure” with Sandinista Nicaragua’s politics.64 
The war to overthrow Luis Somoza Debayle’s government had left Nicaragua’s 
economic infrastructure in ruins. “Nicaragua had suffered a 26 percent drop in production 
in 1979.”65 Rather than redevelop Nicaragua, the Reagan White House sought to bleed it 
dry. Counterrevolutionary groups (“Contras”), composed in part of former National 
Guard members, received US financial and military backing in their war against the 
Sandinista state. “By mid-1987, the war’s direct costs in destruction of capital and lost 
production had reached $676 million” Beyond the huge damages the decade of civil war 
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left on Nicaragua’s economy, “the Reagan Administration exacerbated the economic 
strain by imposing a trade embargo and blocking Nicaragua’s access to international 
development credits from sources such as the World Bank.” The cost of six years at war 
was estimated to be in the range of $3.7 billion, “a prodigious sum for a very small 
economy.”66 Hemorrhaging money in war and economically isolated from everything but 
bilateral credits, the FSLN found itself financially unable to afford its goals and promises. 
In the face of economic and military warfare, Sandinista reformed crumbled under 
democratic elections in 1988. Some indicators, “such as Sandinista pragmatism and 
labors’ continued productivity, suggest that in the absence of hostile US policy, the 
Sandinistas’ economic strategy could have been quite successful in rebuilding the 
country…and in expanding bases for self-sufficiency,” ending the cycles of poverty and 
dependent development.67 The new government, eager to please foreign investors and the 
United States, quickly embraced IMF and World Bank involvement and conditionality, 
and by 1992, nearly a half billion US dollars in loans were flowing to Nicaragua.68 No 
revolution or major form of socio-political instability has occurred since in Nicaragua, 
despite the conditionality attached to loans since 1992. 
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CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICA 
 
From 1948 until 1994, South African society existed under the racial segregation 
of apartheid. While segregation had existed prior to the 1948 election of the white 
National Party (NP), the rise of the NP and the enactment of its policies segregated all 
aspects of South African life.1 With an economic policy aimed at promoting white 
prosperity, inequalities arose that, by the mid-1970s, would fuel domestic strife. 
Nonetheless, these policies’ most important consequences lay in their effect on South 
Africa’s placement in the international economy. As it grew more dependent on global 
markets, the NP lost its political autonomy, and the need for funds amid economic crisis 
required it to make concessions and undergo transitions that, together, would constitute a 
revolution. 
Dependent Development 
The oppressive, racist nature of South African society under the NP and apartheid 
made whites the privileged recipients of the economy’s success. Following the course of  
“Racial Fordism,” South Africa sought industrialization through import substitution of 
white South African consumer goods.2 The combination of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) with the cyclical creation and abuse of unskilled black labor laid 
the foundation upon which apartheid flourished for over four decades.3 The sustained 
exploitation of the vast majority of South Africa’s population for cheap labor required 
sizeable yet mild government intervention in the economy. Throughout its history of 
independence prior to 1994, South Africa’s economic policy featured a large degree of 
“parametric rather than pervasive” government involvement. While avoiding the outright 
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nationalization of any major industries, the state sought the success of Afrikaner-owned 
industry through “tariff protection, import controls, [and] local content regulations.”4  
South Africa’s acceptance of import substitution as a means of growth structured 
manufacturing for the production of consumer goods purchased by whites. Unable to 
meet consumer demand on its own, South African industry had to import complex 
machinery, investment funds, and maintenance equipment. This dependence on abroad 
more than opened South Africa to international shocks; it limited the economy’s ability to 
develop technology to suit its own particular needs, further restricting growth.5 This 
would have dangerous repercussions for the economy were it ever to attempt sustained 
rapid expansion or enter rough economic times—or both. An economic expansion, 
marked by higher demand, required manufacturers to increase imports drastically in a 
short period of time. With increasing limits on foreign financial assistance as apartheid 
continued, problems began to arise within the balance of payments, requiring economic 
policy “to deflate the economy.”6 This aspect of the economy embodies the idea of 
dependent development as “growth within limits,” and ultimately would play a crucial 
role in the overthrow of apartheid. 
 As a means of financing the import of massive quantities of capital, South Africa 
found its role in the international economy to be one of “exporter of precious metals and 
raw materials.”7 South Africa’s large gold reserves allowed for the expansion of industry 
because of gold’s consistently high price on the world market.8 Zavareh Rustomjee and 
Ben Fine argue that mining or, more specifically, the “Minerals-Energy Complex [lay] at 
the core of the South African economy.”9 Beyond providing the foreign exchange 
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required to purchase much-needed capital from abroad, the mining industry was a major 
target for foreign investment, further aiding the growth of the aggregate economy.10 
The gold industry did not sustain the policy of racial Fordism on its own. The goal 
of the NP, “white minority domination exerting pressure…that would enhance white 
living standards,” also played a key rule.12 As a result, the quality of life for whites 
climbed.13 South Africa’s privatized, highly developed “white” economy spanned mines, 
“large conglomerate companies, banks and financial institutions,” along with local 
industry. Meanwhile, since IFI assistance was distributed through the state, apartheid, 
which separated blacks and other non-whites from white capital, left the non-white 
economy decidedly Third World and with little recourse. While crushing poverty and 
high mortality terrorized black communities, the apartheid state constantly advocated 
“white interests, through education, health, social, and employment policies.”13 
ISI did fuel rapid growth in the 1960s, but its reliance on foreign capital made 
South Africa’s economic structures highly dependent on the world economy.14 
Additionally, industry and mining’s high productivity and low wages under apartheid 
made them rather profitable, encouraging foreign direct investment in South Africa.15 As 
foreign involvement in the economy grew, it forced state-backed Afrikaner and 
comparatively weak English capital together, into the web of the global economy; this 
accelerated the rise of white society over that of the impoverished black masses.16 
As dependence on foreign funds and capital swelled, the autonomy of the NP and 
the security of apartheid flagged. Indeed, the degree to which foreign interests had 
invaded the South African economy not only left domestic firms and the state more 
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accountable to foreign capital, but it also made domestic growth wholly dependent on 
financing from abroad.17 Investors worried over the labor market inefficiencies of 
apartheid and the political instability such oppression fostered. With the onset of the debt 
crisis of the 1980s, South Africa’s increasingly dependent position in the world economy 
would become a major factor in bringing the NP to the point of negotiations with the 
African National Congress (ANC), especially with the suspension of foreign loans to the 
state after 1985.18 
Beyond a disadvantaged placement in the world economy, South Africa also 
suffered from the exclusion of its non-white majority population from financial success. 
Wage discrimination was endemic; while the real wage of black workers had not risen in 
the period between 1918 and 1972, whites—amounting to only 10 percent of the labor 
market—earned roughly 67 percent of all wages at the end of this period.19 For many 
blacks, this put education far out of reach, diminishing the black community’s and the 
national economy’s supply of skilled labor.20 Inequality extended past racial imbalances 
within industry and into agriculture and mining; “the black population…represented 83 
percent of the total population but occupied only 13 percent of the land.”21 Miners, 
though slightly better off than most of these farmers, rarely earned the wages an urban 
family needed to survive.22 
These structural inequalities bred widespread, devastating poverty. In the fields of 
“housing, health, education, and water and electricity supply,” apartheid absolutely failed 
the vast majority of South Africa’s people.23 Much of this was rooted in whites’ control 
of indigenous tribal lands; blacks left landless and unemployed by white land grabs found 
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that apartheid granted them limited economic opportunity.24 In the overcrowded, crime-
laden township slums of South African cities waited a disenfranchised, abused population 
aware of the prosperity around them.  
South Africa’s economic growth truly was “accompanied by negative 
repercussions for specific groups and classes”25 Racially motivated fiscal policy cut deep 
inequalities in education and medical care, which left South Africa without the skilled, 
healthy, literate, numerate labor it desperately would require to compete internationally in 
the future. Simply put, the injustices which once faced black South Africans alone 
ultimately would challenge, and unseat, the arbiters of apartheid themselves.26 
Exclusionist State 
As previously noted, an economy as divided as that of South Africa from at least 
the end of World War I through the 1980s requires political intervention to survive—
especially when it exists in a society where nearly 90 percent of the population find 
themselves the disenfranchised class. That “the hegemonic project of the National Party 
was racial exclusion of al those not classified as ‘white’” was no secret.27 Through racial 
Fordism and other tactics, South Africa became a state marked by “a stable form of racial 
domination and economic growth.”28 The exclusionist behavior of the state was not 
restricted solely to economic or political bounds; especially in urban areas, it extended 
into everyday social life. Here, special rules like pass laws limited the daily activities of 
the black workforce “in both the spheres of production and reproduction.”29 
Outside these laws, the violent oppression of mass demonstrations stands out as a 
hallmark of the NP’s exclusionist, repressive state. In March 1960, nonviolent protests 
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against pass laws in the township of Sharpeville ended with 79 blacks dead at the hands 
of the police.30 Sixteen years later in Soweto township, not far from Sharpeville, black 
youth “incensed by racial discrimination and inspired by Steve Biko’s Black 
Consciousness message and the collapse of Portuguese colonialism…started by 
protesting against the government’s attempt to impose the use of more Afrikaans”—
viewed as the language of the oppressor—“in schools.”31 By the end of the Soweto 
Uprising, as it became known, police forces had left more than 600 dead.32 
The reproduction of the system of apartheid was a very clear goal of the NP, and 
violence the most obvious means to this end. Great resources were expended for the 
suppression of opposition groups like the ANC, with nearly a third of the workers at 
South Africa’s London Embassy serving as intelligence officers. Violent attempts at 
oppression rarely stopped at South African borders. One ANC and South African 
Communist Party (SACP) leader died in 1982 when she opened a letter bomb in Maputo, 
while another ANC leader was gunned down in the streets of Paris in late 1988.33 
In the 1980s, facing heightened pressure to reform, Prime Minister P.W. Botha 
“introduced polices designed to maintain white rule by combining security measures with 
internal social reforms,” maintaining apartheid by changing its appearance.34 Despite 
these attempts at so-called reform, structures of exclusion and violence continued. The 
adoption of a new constitution in 1984 attempted to diffuse the time bomb of popular 
dissent by involving Indians and “Coloureds” (typically those of historically African and 
European ancestry) in the political process. Its inability, however, to create an effective 
process of transferring rights to blacks meant that apartheid, and the violence that 
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accompanied it, was still as exclusive and vicious as ever.35 During the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA), an ANC campaign of demonstrations and 
stayaways ended in brutality: on June 17, 1992, in the midst of the sixteenth anniversary 
of the Soweto Uprising, over 50 residents36 of Boipatong township were murdered at the 
hands of police and the Inkatha Freedom Movement, an NP ally.37  
Cultures of Opposition 
The ANC, along with its military arm Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and other 
smaller parties, long carried the revolutionary torch in South Africa. Along with its allies, 
the ANC, via its organization and support of stayaways, boycotts, or uprisings—and its 
returning of these to popular consciousness—“ensured that South Africa continued to 
sustain pressure from within.”38 By promoting the stories of black opposition leaders like 
Steve Biko—whom South African police brutally murdered in 1977—or Nelson 
Mandela, the ANC framed repression through specific, familiar stories.  
The harsh repression and intense poverty under which much of society suffered 
provided another framing mechanism suited for uniting large swaths of the population. 
During its years of struggle and its rise to power in the early 1990s, the ANC explicitly 
sought the “‘rapid improvement in the quality of life of the poorest, most oppressed and 
disadvantaged people.’”39 The National Party and apartheid were not the only targets of 
such framing. During the negotiation process, Charles Nqakula, General Secretary of the 
SACP—a staunch ANC ally and co-founder of the MK—linked the suffering of many of 
South Africa’s people to the Bretton Woods Institutions, which he accused of forcing 
their own agendas on the developing world. Only through a sole reliance on South 
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African resources and a rejection of IFI policies like export-led growth, he argued, could 
the people of South Africa become their own rulers.40 Indeed, before 1993 even the ANC 
saw the IMF and World Bank as reactionary forces that would forestall the 
implementation of the organization’s central goals.41 
Economic Downturn 
The struggles of the South African economy between 1970 and 1994 grew from 
the problems of inequalities and international dependence created racial Fordism. These 
hindered the economy’s ability to adapt to changes in the world market while also 
making it vulnerable to debt crisis, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and oil 
shocks. Despite these challenges, however, in the 1980s South Africa had numerous 
assets working in its favor: a large domestic market, qualified research universities, First 
World financial services, and an ever-developing industrial sector.42 
Regardless of South Africa’s many advantages, big problems loomed. While 
South Africa’s average annual GDP growth rate was 4.9 percent between 1945 and 1974, 
even at the dawn of the 1970s economic flaws in racial Fordism were glaring. The failed 
inclusion of excess labor from now landless rural communities and the lack of 
domestically produced capital placed limits on growth.43 As the global economy declined 
during the late 1970s, economic conditions within South Africa worsened.44 The 
appreciation of the US dollar vis-à-vis gold, accordingly, and high US interest rates left 
the economy “in a state of crisis.”45 
Changing dynamics within the international gold market further impeded the 
South African political economy’s ability to sustain apartheid. In the past, South African 
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gold had dominated the market so much that to boycott it was to take all new gold off the 
market This had changed by the 1980s; the high price of gold allowed countries with less 
accessible reserves to mine and sell their gold profitably. Indeed, these newer producers 
often headed campaigns for sanctions against South African gold.46 The drop in the dollar 
price of gold near the end of the 1970s weakened South Africa’s ability to acquire foreign 
exchange and to finance the purchase of capital; accordingly, the South African current 
account ran up a $4.38 billion deficit in 1981.47 
The injustices of apartheid incited periods of social unrest which discouraged 
crucial foreign investment, further aggravating the fragile political-economic balance. 
Beyond the uncertainty of such a high-risk market, many Western bankers had to heed 
the reservations of their depositors, investors, and governments over South Africa’s 
human rights record.48 Following the failure of CODESA II, violent uprising seemed 
highly likely, and the amount of foreign direct investment plummeted.49 In conjunction 
with a freeze on foreign loans to South Africa, investor demands would have a critical 
role in the overthrow of the apartheid state and society. 
As foreign funds shrank, limited domestic investment could scarcely match 
depreciation. Meanwhile, the swelling black labor force was chronically and intentionally 
under-educated, severely limiting opportunities for employment.50 For those who 
managed to find employment in manufacturing, average rates of growth for real wages 
since 1980 were negative.51 These factors combined with the global economic downturn 
to spawn a deep recession. Additionally, balance of payments issues and increased state 
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spending caused inflation to leap into the double digits (Figure 1), which would have a 
sizeable effect on poor, typically non-white households. 
World-Systemic Opening: IMF And World Bank Involvement 
The economic and social consequences of apartheid left the state heavily 
dependent on the intervention of IFIs. As the international economy grew unstable during 
the 1970s, its failures impacted the South African political economy in increasingly 
complex ways, pushing it toward socio-political collapse. As a result, the South African 
economy required evermore direct, external support; in this way, the IMF became a 
powerful player in the South African political economy.52 
All apartheid-era loan activity on part of the World Bank ceased after the early 
1960s; however, following World War II, “enormous long-term loans”53 were made for 
the “development of the country’s physical infrastructure (electricity, railways, harbours) 
[which] was vital to the new apartheid regime’s strategy of industrialization.”54 So 
effective were the measures such loans supported that, following 1967, South Africa 
qualified as “a higher-income developing country,” making it ineligible for loans from 
the International Development Agency of the World Bank.55 Thus, the successful support 
of the apartheid regime—more than disapproval of the racist and repressive society the 
NP had created—prompted the end of World Bank involvement in South Africa. 
Unlike the World Bank, the IMF remained highly active in apartheid-era South 
Africa until the mid-1980s, when its large Western shareholders could no longer afford 
the appearance of sustaining apartheid through critical financial assistance. Yet, the 
historical record of IMF involvement in South Africa suggests intentional support of the 
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NP, and hence its policy and goals. When the state received its first IMF loan from 1957-
1958, it carried no conditionality—rare even at this time; while Latin American countries 
struggled to meet such standards, South Africa’s experience under white rule tells of a 
“rather close and cozy relationship” with the IMF, likely due to South Africa’s geo-
political position during the Cold War.56 
The increase in regional and strictly South African socio-political instability in the 
early- to mid-1970s left the South African state in an anxious position, especially as the 
neighboring Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique fell to black African 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Annual GDP growth and inflation between 1961 and 1994, which shows the remarkably high 
interest rates and instable and comparatively low GDP growth during the last thirty-three years of 
apartheid.57 
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rule and civil war. The resulting fear that instability within South similarly could 
transform into revolution drove a massive increase in defense expenditures. Between 
1973 and 1975, real military spending climbed 97 percent; to accommodate these 
increases while keeping government spending constant in real terms, there was a 
“substantial” real decline in other government expenditures during this period. The 
government could do this because the rate of money growth had shot to nearly 20 per 
year through a dynamic of  “defense expenditures leading to budget deficits, budget 
deficits leading to inflation, inflation leading to balance of payments problems” in need 
of IMF assistance.58  
Outside of its increased military spending, South Africa was imposing 
conditionality upon itself. By cutting, or at least not growing, non-military expenditures, 
the funds available for education and health, especially for the disenfranchised black 
population, could not match pace with either inflation or population growth. As a result, 
IMF assistance—totaling SDR643.2 between 1975-1977—basically funded the 
repression of the black and non-white majority.59 South Africa’s increase in spending on 
“defence and law and order”60 from 1976-1977 totaled $450 million, “almost exactly the 
amount of IMF assistance” provided during that time.61 Evidence so damning soon would 
bring the crushing weight of international financial abandonment upon the NP. 
While “foreign investment in South Africa paid the highest return of any foreign 
investment in the world,” the fact remained the economy struggled to attract investors; 
indeed, lower levels of investment in South Africa relative to similarly sized economies 
were a likely cause of the economy’s high marginal return on investment.62 With 
 65 
investors uncertain about South Africa and with gold still at a low price, the country’s 
economy appeared to be poised for major problems. 
In an effort to preempt further economic problems without cutting its military 
budget, South Africa turned again to the IMF in 1982. In another demonstration of 
Western shareholders’ commitment to South Africa, the Fund approved a $1.1 billion 
loan in November 1982. Opposition to the loan was widespread but limited to members 
with developing economies, who lacked the quota and the votes to overrule the West.63 It 
was not simply the loan’s amount that stirred up such resistance; rather, objections 
stemmed from an apparent disregard for IMF protocol: “approval was given without 
conditions related to the country’s political system or the impact of this system on the 
efficiency of its economy.”64 The loan’s opponents within the IMF maintained that South 
African government policies were “anathema to the IMF’s view of the world and its 
ideological stance on questions of development.”65 While apartheid topped the list as a 
labor market inefficiency, South Africa’s loose monetary policy, trade restrictions, and 
“dual exchange rate regime” also were cited.66 The small conditions attached to the loan 
failed to address these in any meaningful way. 
The majority of the $1.1 billion came from the Compensatory Financing Facility 
(CFF). Since the loan had drawn South Africa’s entire CFF quota, the IMF was to 
enforce specific steps—conditions—proven to solve balance of payments issues South 
Africa faced before disbursal of the loan. In reality, the loan came with no such 
conditionality; that South Africa could take a full 80 percent of the loan before any of its 
lenient conditions could be enforced demonstrates the preferential treatment South Africa 
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received from the Fund.67 Indeed, the loan seemed highly unnecessary; the IMF itself had 
forecasted a $1.6 billion dollar surplus for South Africa in 1983, and the country’s credit 
ranking left it easily capable of seeking and obtaining loans in private global markets.68 
Such a non-procedural loan inspired a large outcry. In the US, which had used its 
large quota of votes to push the loan through, public disgust resulted in the 1983 Gramm 
Amendment, which outlawed US support for IMF loans to South Africa unless the US 
Secretary of the Treasury could guarantee the loan would “‘reduce the distortions caused 
by apartheid.’” While this allowed a loophole for the allocation of some aid to South 
Africa, it effectively ended IMF loans to the country for the next ten years.69 Even the 
IMF itself joined the protest. In the IMF’s first economic criticism of apartheid, Fund 
advisors informed South Africa on May 19, 1983, that the state’s recurring BOP crises 
could only be solved through reform of the labor market. Only an end to apartheid could 
stabilize the economy in the long run.70  
Through 1984, “the IMF represented a critical source of funds to South Africa for 
offsetting [its] balance of payments deficits.”71 The relationship came with limited 
conditionality for a regime whose policies strayed far from the IMF’s stated ideals. This 
was tolerated politically because the United States sought to counter Soviet influence in 
the region; the capitalism-minded National Party presented itself as a bulwark against 
Marxism in Africa, especially in its struggle against the socialist-leaning ANC.72 
Furthermore, many powerful Western corporations had important and substantially 
productive investments in apartheid-era South Africa, and their deep ties to the political 
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decision makers in their home countries worked to protect South Africa from reforms that 
carried the risks of civil war on nationalization.73 
Revolution 
Instability and uncertainty characterized the late 1980s in South Africa: 
“recession, drought, an absence of major new loans, slow inward investment, increasing 
capital flight, [and] spectacular political violence.”74 Such difficulties, especially the 
continuing decline in new FDI, left the NP desperate for nearly any solution, and 
negotiation offered one such escape from the political economy’s troubles.75 Indeed, 
during deliberations the NP’s bargaining position relative to the ANC rested heavily on 
the macroeconomic conditions South Africa faced, especially in terms of its ability to 
borrow.76 
For State President F.W. de Klerk, the proper course of action was quite unclear. 
Whites, the basis of support for the NP, faced a dilemma: was economic success worth 
the loss of some, or even all, socio-political power? Initially, the NP saw the answer to 
this question in power sharing: something along the lines of the Tricameral Parliament 
established under the 1984 Constitution, with houses separated by racial makeup.77 
Global pressures—most especially the withholding of IMF funds—and rising domestic 
unrest strained racial Fordism and encouraged a turn to liberal markets.78 Nonetheless, 
opening up to the free market prior to political reform was not a clear panacea; it 
threatened to increase inequality as whites, who composed South Africa’s political, 
social, and economic power base, “had a clear advantage over blacks in competing in the 
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job market.”79 Only the desire “to preserve ethnic privilege” and an unwillingness on the 
part of IFIs prevented such a change from happening outright.80  
Internal debate over what goals were to be sought in negotiation was not unique to 
the NP. Within the ANC existed the dilemma of seeking the nationalization of mining or 
the adoption of liberal economic policies. Going in the face of decades of ANC economic 
rhetoric, the “leading economists of the African National Congress believed that the 
legitimacy associated with the IMF was required for a democratic South Africa to access 
international financial markets.”81 
The dire condition of the South African political economy following the 1980s 
resulted in the 1990 unbanning of the ANC. For the first time, legitimate negotiations 
could occur between the NP and its chief opposition.82 The first round of negotiations, 
CODESA I, ultimately resulted in an impasse; no agreement could be reached over the 
composition of the body that would draft the state’s new constitution. It did produce, 
however, “a Declaration of Intent…that South Africa should be undivided, should enjoy 
peaceful constitutional changes, should be a multiparty democracy with universal adult 
suffrage, and have a constitution establishing separation of powers and containing a Bill 
of Rights.”83 
The actual fruits of CODESA II, started a few months after the end of the first 
round of CODESA, were similarly void of much practicality. While it was important in 
creating “the precursor to the final constitution,”84 CODESA II quickly derailed 
following the Boipatong massacre, as the ANC walked out in the face of such forthright 
repression. The NP’s complicity in the atrocity, however, forced the its own hand. To 
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withdraw from the process of negotiations at this time risked civil war, to say nothing of 
the response the IFIs and investors would have to such a move. As a result, de Klerk’s 
administration desperately needed to restart talks, although Boipatong had cost it 
legitimacy and placed it in a greatly disadvantaged position.85 
Negotiations restarted on September 26, 1992, at the behest of the ANC, which 
now obviously held the upper hand in any debates.86 In return, de Klerk, now keenly 
aware and afraid of the risks of failure, dropped the NP’s previous demands for minority 
vetoes and ethnic power sharing in favor of “majority rule, based on one person, one 
vote, one value.”87 Elections for this new state and its Government of National Unity 
(GNU) took place on April 27, 1994. After 46 years, the system of apartheid—in its 
political, social, and, at least officially, economic forms—had fallen.88 
Postscript: Was the South African Revolution Social? 
Socio-political literature on revolution in South Africa leaves much to the mind of 
the observer. Within the confines of this study, which uses Foran’s model of revolution in 
the developing world, the overthrow of apartheid constitutes social revolution. This 
statement flies in the face of Foran himself, who describes “the uprooting of apartheid” as 
“a remarkable political revolution” and nothing more.89 
Foran’s argument for a political rather than social revolution is rooted heavily in 
the fact that the socialist message of the ANC was abandoned following, he argues, “the 
collapse of the East Bloc that rendered the ANC’s socialist economic alternative 
decidedly unfashionable.”90 In other words, because the economic privilege traditionally 
held by whites scarcely shifted to the non-white majority, the societal aspects of the 
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revolutionary movement stalled, resulting only in political change. This ignores the many 
social gains the fall of the apartheid achieved. It eliminated the state-structured control of 
black lives via passbooks and townships, although not townships themselves. It solved, 
albeit incompletely, a crisis that “was at once interclass, interregional, and state-
market.”91 It bestowed upon the formerly oppressed not only citizenship, but also 
humanity. 
Additionally, many of the often-cited social failures of the revolution were chosen 
specifically by the revolutionaries to achieve the core social goals of the resistance 
movement. Despite its advantages in negotiations following the Boipatong massacre, the 
ANC had to ensure that the new government would be able to run itself, despite the 
ANC’s total lack of experience with managing a state.  As a result it needed to maintain 
positive relations with members of the white apartheid-era bureaucracy in order to 
capitalize on their talents and practical knowledge in running a government.92 “As it 
transpired, the experience of the NP ministers was valuable in the GNU’s early days.”93 
Other decisions, such as avoiding destructive civil war or abandoning the long-
preached nationalization of the mines, were fueled by the desire to grow the economy via 
peaceful liberalization in an equitable way rather than through the potentially violent 
redistribution of wealth. While this allowed for the return of IMF loans within a context 
devoid of state-propagated labor market inefficiencies, it also required Truth and 
Reconciliation, “or apology without restitution.”94 Social changes were made or foregone 
with the consent of the ANC in order to guarantee the survival of personal autonomy and 
the post-apartheid, majority-rule state. 
 71 
Notes 
1. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Apartheid,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 
ahttp://search.eb.com/eb/article-9007978 (accessed April 15, 2010). 
2. Stephen Gelb, “South Africa’s Economic Crisis: An Overview,” South Africa’s 
Economic Crisis, ed. Stephen Gelb, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd, 1991), 2. 
3. Mike Morris, “State, Capital and Growth: The Political Economy of the 
National Question,” South Africa’s Economic Crisis, ed. Stephen Gelb, (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd, 1991), 35. 
4. Ibid., 37. 
5. Brian Kahn, “The Crisis and South Africa’s Balance of Payments,” South 
Africa’s Economic Crisis, ed. Stephen Gelb, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd, 
1991), 62. 
6. Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa 
(London: Hurst & Company, 1996), 6-7. 
7. Kahn, “South Africa’s Balance of Payments,” 62. 
8. Gelb, “South Africa’s Economic Crisis,” 2. 
9. Fine and Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa, 5. 
10. Bill Freund, “South African Gold Mining in Transformation,” South Africa’s 
Economic Crisis, ed. Stephen Gelb, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd, 1991), 113. 
11. Gelb, “South Africa’s Economic Crisis,” 15. 
12. Ibid., 2. 
13. James Barber, Mandela’s World: The International Dimension of South 
Africa’s Political Revolution 1990-1999 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2004), 51. 
14. Gelb, “South Africa’s Economic Crisis,” 16. 
15. Kahn, “South Africa’s Balance of Payments,” 62. 
16. Morris, “State, Capital, and Growth,” 41. 
17. Michael H. Allen, Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of 
Transformation in South Africa: Revolution at a Bargain? (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 34. 
18. Ibid., 31. 
19. Freund, “South African Gold Mining in Transformation,” 112. 
20. William Gutteridge, “South Africa: Evolution or Revolution,” Conflict 
Studies, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, No. 171 London, 1984, 24. 
21. James Morrell and David Gisselquist, “Special Report: How the IMF Slipped 
$464 Million to South Africa,” Center for International Progress, January 1978, 2. 
22. Freund, “South African Gold Mining in Transformation,” 112. 
23. Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee, “South Africa’s Transition: The 
Policy Agenda,” The Political Economy of South Africa’s Transition: Policy Perspectives 
in the Late 1990s, ed. Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee (New York, NY: Dryden 
Press, 1997), 15. 
24. Gelb, “South Africa’s Economic Crisis,” 17. 
25. John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 19. 
 72 
26. Morrell and Gisselquist, “Special Report,” 2. 
27. Morris, “State, Capital, and Growth,” 38. 
28. Ibid., 36. 
29. Ibid., 37. 
30. Barber, Mandela’s World, 15. 
31. Ibid., 19. 
32. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “African National Congress,” Encyclopedia 
Britannica, http://search.eb.com/eb/article-284098 (accessed April 11, 2010). 
33. Barber, Mandela’s World, 15-16. 
34. Ibid., 23. 
35. Gutteridge, “South Africa: Evolution or Revolution,” 18 
36. ANC Press Statements, “Boipatong Massacre,” African National Congress 
(June 18, 1992), http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1992/pr0618.html (accessed April 11, 
2010). 
37. Allen, Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation, 111. 
38. Vishnu Padayachee, “The Politics of South Africa’s International Financial 
Relations, 1970-1990,” South Africa’s Economic Crisis, ed. Stephen Gelb, (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd, 1991), 90. 
39. Michie and Padayachee, “South Africa’s Transition,” 15. 
40. Barber, Mandela’s World, 70. 
41. Ibid., 78. 
42. Allen, Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation, 3. 
43. Gelb, “South Africa’s Economic Crisis,” 2. 
44. Padayachee, “Politics of International Financial Relations,” 90. 
45. Gutteridge, “South Africa: Evolution or Revolution,” 22. 
46. Freund, “South African Gold Mining in Transformation,” 125. 
47. Vishnu Padayachee, “The Evolution of South Africa’s International Financial 
Relations,” The Political Economy of South Africa’s Transition: Policy Perspectives in 
the Late 1990s, ed. Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee (New York, NY: Dryden 
Press, 1997), 28. 
48. Allen, Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation, 32. 
49. Ibid., 112. 
50. Fine and Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa,  6. 
51. Michie and Padayachee, “South Africa’s Transition,” 13. 
52. Padayachee, “Politics of International Financial Relations,” 89. 
53. Fine and Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa, 158. 
54. Padayachee, “Evolution of International Financial Relations,” 49. 
55. Ibid., 29. 
56. Ibid., 28. 
57. The World Bank Group, “Quick Query selected from World Development 
Indicators,” The World Bank Group, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ 
DDPQQ/member.do ?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135 (accessed January 
20, 2010). 
58. Morrell and Gisselquist, “Special Report,” 1-2. 
 73 
59. Padayachee, “Evolution of International Financial Relations,” 28. 
60. Vishnu Padayachee, “Apartheid South Africa and the International Monetary 
Fund,” Transformation, no. 3 (1987), 43. 
61. Morrell and Gisselquist, “Special Report,” 3. 
62. Ibid., 3. 
63. “Aid Memo,” Center for International Progress, January 6, 1983, 1. 
64. Padayachee, “Politics of International Financial Relations,” 91. 
65. Ibid., 92. 
66. “Aid Memo,” Center for International Progress, January 6, 1983, 3. 
67. John Loxley, "The IMF, the World Bank, and Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies 
and Politics," The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: Conditionality, Impact, and 
Alternatives, ed. Kjell J. Havnevik (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987), 56. 
68. Padayachee, “Apartheid South Africa,” 47. 
69. Padayachee, “Evolution of International Financial Relations,” 28. 
70. “Aid Memo” Center for International Progress, July 27, 1983, 1. 
71. Padayachee, “Politics of International Financial Relations,” 89-90. 
72. Barber, Mandela’s World, 20-21. 
73. Padayachee, “Politics of South Africa’s International Financial Relations,” 92. 
74. Allen, Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation, 35. 
75. Ibid., 112. 
76. Ibid., 31. 
77. Ibid., 33. 
78. Ibid., 52. 
79. Barber, Mandela’s World, 52. 
80. Allen, Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation, 121. 
81. Patrick Bond, Against Global Apartheid: South Africa Meets the World Bank, 
IMF and International Finance (New York, NY: Zed Books Ltd, 2003), 68 
82. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “African National Congress,” Encyclopedia 
Britannica, http://search.eb.com/eb/article-284099 (accessed April 11, 2010). 
83. Allen, Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation, 107. 
84. Ibid., 132. 
85. Barber, Mandela’s World, 78-79. 
86. Allen, Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation, 113. 
87. Barber, Mandela’s World, 79. 
88. Ibid., 81. 
89. Foran, Taking Power, 225. 
90. Ibid., 225. 
91. Allen, Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation, 97. 
92. Barber, Mandela’s World, 79. 
93. Ibid., 86. 
94. Allen, Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation, 183. 
 
 74 
CHAPTER 5: NEPAL 
 
Nepal has the unfortunate distinction of being “one of the most aided ‘developing’ 
nations on earth,” a state with a history of biting poverty and ethnic marginalization for a 
large swath of the countryside.1 “About 87% of Nepal’s population live in rural areas and 
rely on agriculture as a major source of income and employment.”2 The state’s terrain, 
limited resources, and landlocked position have made large-scale industrialization 
difficult through any means. As a result, manufacturing remains a very small component 
of the economy, controlling only 3 percent of the workforce and 10 percent of the 
economy as a whole.3 
During the second half of the twentieth century, as agricultural productivity 
slowed, the Nepali economy struggled; and BOP deficits necessitated the introduction of 
adjustment programs. Economic issues, an antiquated and repressive political system, and 
the imposition of Hindu caste structures on an ethno-religiously diverse society 
culminated in heightened political instability in 1990 and the Maoist revolution which, 
still ongoing, erupted in 1996. 
Dependent Development 
 
Nepal’s history of slow growth and endemic poverty shares many similarities 
with the case of Nicaragua. As a geographical area marked by numerous mountain 
ranges, rivers, and dense jungles, Nepal is unfriendly to transportation. Consequently, 
subsistence farming has typified Nepal’s economy and agriculture history. During the 
latter part of the twentieth century, however, the economy began to shift toward export-
driven agriculture. The results were disastrous. “By the 1980s Nepal had turned from a 
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net exporter to a net importer of food grains and the continuing fragmentation of holdings 
made it more and more difficult for ordinary peasant families to feed themselves.” As a 
result, many peasant families began to slide further into debt, turning to emigration in 
hope of employment.4 The flow of Nepalese to the Persian Gulf for work in petroleum 
refinement and related jobs has been both well documented and an important source of 
foreign exchange for the Nepali economy.5 
These changes, along with drops in the prices of rice and jute, fueled growing 
landlessness. By mid-1984, 44 percent of rural Nepali households had lost their 
property.6 Forced from the full-time employment of subsistence farming on their own 
land, these peasants struggled to find work. Without any other sources of employment 
available, unemployment in rural districts climbed very high, which significantly 
increased frustration and resentment among youth.”7 This blatant exclusion of rural 
communities—many of them ethnic, religious, or caste minorities—is characteristic of 
dependent development in the form of growth “accompanied by negative repercussions 
for specific groups and classes.”8 As the 1990s progressed, Maoists were able to recruit 
support from these frustrated rural communities heavily.9 
The impact of the shift to export-based agriculture was not limited to the 
distribution of cultivable land alone. The resulting expansion of agriculture accelerated 
the destruction of Nepal’s forests, which throughout Nepal’s history had provided fodder, 
fertilizer, and firewood to the peasantry—an important buffer from famine.10 This 
phenomenon was not especially unique to Nepal. It is classic in countries where 
dependent development took place in the form of export agriculture. Nepal’s southern 
 76 
neighbor, India, underwent massive famines in the late Victorian era as a result of rapid 
trade liberalization and a sudden transition to export crops. The resulting famines—
sparked by regional drought, market forces, a shift toward inedible crops like cotton, and 
the plowing under of many of India’s resource-filled jungles—killed tens of millions of 
Indian peasants between 1876 and 1902.11 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Graph of Nepal’s annual percent rates of GDP growth and of population growth between 1960 
and 2001. While population growth does not seem to be a large factor in this presentation, it is important to 
note that this data is aggregate for the entirety of Nepal. Population growth during this period was highest, 
and GDP growth the lowest, in rural areas, far removed from the limited attempts at industrialization.15 
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While a marked improvement in the quality of life for everyday Nepalese has 
been the stated goal of many of the governments in power since 1951, decades of 
monarchical rule has failed in this endeavor.12 Population growth historically has 
outstripped GDP growth in rural areas, straining state resources.13 In 2006 agriculture 
comprised 50 percent of Nepal’s GDP, a decline from its 80 percent share in the 1960s. 
While population growth has been faulted for much of agriculture’s role in the weakening 
of the economy, many critics point also to the inefficiency of farming techniques as at 
least equally culpable.14 
The government’s supposed commitment to improving living standards 
nationwide ironically had a significantly urban-industrial bent, despite the small 
percentage of Nepalese who lived in urban areas. As a result, funds were diverted from 
agricultural development to manufacturing. In fact, since the overthrow of the Ranas and 
the push for modernization in the mid-1950s, agriculture has failed to receive over 26 
percent of development assistance; of that 26 percent, much was invested in relatively 
developed, easily accessible regions like the Terai.16 This left little room for the creation 
or implementation of new technologies or practices to boost agricultural productivity. 
Between 1973 and 1980, agricultural production grew at a rate of zero, while grain 
production, specifically, shrank 1 percent.17 In conjunction with annual population 
growth rates around 2 percent, this trend further impoverished Nepal.18 
Other government policies also had a large impact on the destruction of rural 
living standards. The state-owned Nepal Food Corporation purchased from exporters a 
fixed portion of rice and food oils below market prices in order to provide the urban 
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population cheap food. The fact that these foods were forcibly sold beneath their market 
price discouraged investment in agriculture and fostered investment in industry, which 
the government protected through tariffs and favorable exchange rates.19 
Nepal in 1956 had embraced import substitution industrialization (ISI) “with a 
view to creating employment opportunities and improving living standards.” In an 
attempt to bolster this sector, the state erected strict protectionist measures and 
apportioned financial aid to it. Nonetheless, these firms were terribly inefficient, while 
their public ownership discouraged growth in privately owned industry, “which could 
have created employment opportunities for a growing population.” The result was 
government failure to accumulate resources for the improvement of the quality of 
everyday Nepali lives.20 
Nowhere was the urban bias more obvious than in the Kathmandu Valley. The 
country’s largest urban area, the Valley’s large population and role in trade buffered it 
from the crushing poverty of the rural districts. “The Valley was a natural entrepot for 
trade between Tibet and India since merchants from the south could only cross the Terai 
in the cold season when the aul, a virulent form of malaria, had abated, but then needed 
to wait for warmer winter weather before crossing the mountain passes.”21The majority 
of Nepal’s economic activity occurs here or in the flat, relatively fertile region of the 
Terai.22 
While Nepali industry saw relative success, its small size and the size of its 
workforce greatly limited its effect on the Nepali political economy.23 Meanwhile, in 
rural areas, cash crops comprised only 15 percent of agricultural production.24 These facts 
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indicate the failure of the government during the 1970s in encouraging conservation of 
natural resources, domestically-oriented agriculture, and regional development—that is, 
in equalizing the distribution of resources between the Kathmandu Valley and Terai and 
the state’s poorer regions.25 
While about 40 percent of Nepal’s government spending draws from foreign 
aid,26 distribution of these funds has the mark of prejudiced decision-making and 
influence. Some of this assistance was directed toward infrastructure: in the forty years 
between 1951 and 2000, the total length of Nepal’s roadways stretched from 276 
kilometers to 15,308.27 However, other practical results that could have had meaningful, 
direct impact in the lives of the poor were less tangible, if real at all. As growth in the 
agricultural sector was nonexistent in the decades following the establishment of the 
Panchayat system, foreign development funds have had marginal effect on the poor.28 
Meanwhile, many of the urban projects completed prior to the Maoist revolution “tended 
to benefit only the local merchant classes, without any general rise in living standards.”29 
The Nepali political economy is also heavily dependent on that of India. Indeed, 
India’s economic dominance is largely to blame for the low levels of industry seen in 
Nepal throughout the twentieth century, as mass-produced Indian goods constantly had 
flooded the Nepali consumer market.30 Beyond sheer economics, India also has a history 
of military and political intervention in Nepal, sometimes at the behest of the Nepali 
government.31 
Dependent development in Nepal took place on multiple levels. At its most 
obvious, it was an unequal distribution of wealth, development funds, and government 
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protection drawn along the urban-rural line. As agro-export became an important part of 
the national economy, land was consolidated into fewer hands, forcing many peasants out 
of their homes and their traditional means of employment and survival. The misdirection 
of development funds resulted in the stagnation of this sector of the economy, and as a 
result the benefits expected from it never materialized. This resulted not only in 
unemployment for peasants seeking work in large export-farming ventures, but also in 
lower aggregate output. Elsewhere, government policy and foreign aid projects favored 
the small urban bourgeoisie at the cost of the rural poor and equitable growth. 
Exclusionist State 
 
The unification of modern Nepal occurred under the rule, and sword, of Prithvi 
Narayan Shah, the King of Gorkha, between 1743 and his death in 1775.  In this time, the 
Kathmandu Valley and many areas outside the state’s present-day boundaries fell under 
the rule of this first King of Nepal.32 The area he conquered encompassed rugged terrain 
at the crossroads of Central Asia, India, and China. With 59 nationalities, 102 
ethnic/caste groups, and 37.2 percent of Nepalese belonging to indigenous groups, Nepal 
encompasses a large degree of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity, 
although in many cases geographic barriers separated these diverse groups.33 Unification 
thus opened the door for oppression and exploitation of Nepal’s minority ethnic groups; 
indeed, many of Nepal’s poorer districts have a preponderance of such groups. 
With a very homogeneous state planted on top so heterogeneous a society, a 
tradition of exclusionist, personalistic, and at times repressive, government emerged. In 
1846, the Rana family seized power from the monarchy, relegating it to a largely 
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symbolic role and establishing a hereditary claim to the now all-powerful Prime Minister 
position.34 “The crown claimed legitimacy as the protector of…Hinduism…while the 
Rana regime reinforced and preserved the social hierarchy associated it with it. In the 
process, they sealed off the country from the outside world as a means of protecting their 
sovereignty and growing their power.35 So intense was this fear of losing power that 
Nepal’s first university was not opened until 1918, putting Nepal at a disadvantage in the 
production of human capital. 
The end of British rule in India cost the Rana regime “its most powerful foreign 
sponsor.”36 The democratically elected government that replaced the Ranas in 1951 
quickly was overthrown itself by King Mahendra on December 15, 1960. In its place, 
Mahendra established the Panchayat system, under which “the King kept all executive 
powers [while] people around him enjoyed privileges which promoted lack of 
transparency and favoritism.” This system also placed limits on personal freedoms and 
legalized the suppression of all political parties. Economic policy restricted trade in an 
effort to bolster domestic industry.37  
Under this “veneer of democratic participation and electoral accountability,” the 
king exercised absolute power with little fear of political repercussions, even in response 
to the most unfavorable of policies.38 Nonetheless, this also disabled traditional means of 
political organization which in the past had allowed for the airing of complaints; without 
this safety valve, grievances sparked by government repression shifted public opinion 
further away from the state toward new means of political engagement.39 
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Exclusion was not limited to political or economic spheres. Socially, caste 
standing held strong influence. “Rajput blood, real or imagined, was to remain an 
important status symbol,” key to inclusion in the upper echelons of Nepali political 
society. The dissent of the King and Queen over his lover’s non-Rajput status reportedly 
provided the motivation for Crown Prince Dipendra’s murderous rampage through the 
royal palace complex in June 2001.40 
Hindu Newars—who, along with the socio-religious elite of Brahmans and 
Chetri-Thakuris, comprised only one-third of the state’s population—held nearly al 
political power;41 dominated by Hindus, Nepali society suffered widely from caste 
discrimination.42 Ethno-class tensions would come into play in the late 1980s and early 
1990s as aid, especially poverty reduction efforts from Nepal’s Structural Adjustment 
Loans, was misdirected toward projects sponsored by wealthy families or appropriated by 
corrupt (usually Newar) civil servants.43 While the actions of the crown pushed away 
many of the nation’s non-royal elites, within rural areas or small communities such 
behavior on the part of state administrators forced public opinion away from the 
government at all levels. 
With the onset of the Maoist uprising in the mid-1990s, the state heightened its 
repressive tactics, bringing a level of violence unseen in the suppression of previous 
demonstrations. Police actions that started in 1996, under the new administration of 
Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, were “indiscriminate and brutal enough to increase 
local resentment against the government as well as insufficiently sustained to act as a real 
deterrent.”44 By targeting civilians along with Maoist fighters, often in the neglected rural 
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areas of the country where the Maoists held their greatest power, the exclusionist state 
further alienated the population. 
Cultures of Opposition 
 
Nepal’s history is rich in traditions of mass mobilization of political opposition 
and unrest. While “Nepal is sometimes thought of as a peaceful Shangri-La,” since its 
unification it has a history of public protest and violent struggle.45 Whelpton cites pre-
unification examples of mass action in the Kathmandu Valley as evidence of the 
historically crucial role of crowd action in Nepalese politics during heightened elite 
conflict.46 Even the tightly managed Nepal of the Ranas experienced numerous “peasant 
insurgencies.”47 At the end of the twenty-first century, the Maoists were able also to draw 
on the successful experiences of jana andolan, a mass action campaign against the 
repression of the Panchayat system in 1990 48 
 Rolpa and Rukum, the two districts at the heart of the revolution, had their own 
history of political agitation prior to the outbreak of the Maoist insurgency in 1996.49 The 
poverty in these regions was likely the most prominent framing mechanism for 
revolutionaries, as Quy-Toan Do finds that “poverty is significantly associated with the 
onset of the conflict, as well as its continuation.”50 
Under the Hindu state and the Newar-Hindu elite, many non-Hindu ethnic 
minorities fell into lower levels of caste strata. Nonetheless, as “it was unusual for any 
one caste or ethnic group to make up more than 50 percent of the population in any 
district,” ethno-caste issues had to be incorporated into broader coalitions instead of into 
numerous tiny self-autonomy movements. While these issues played a prominent role in 
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Nepal following 1991, they were not alone.51 Nonetheless, the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist), the instigator of the revolution, quickly incorporated ethnic discontent into their 
platform as a means of gathering these groups to their cause.52 In this way, the Maoists 
framed their goal of overturning “social and economic injustice against the poor, 
particularly in rural and remote areas,” in terms acceptable to an even larger fraction of 
the rural population—an effective tactic considering the placement of much of the 
economy’s resources in the hands of the powerful Newar group.53 
Economic Downturn 
The problems which historically had plagued the Nepali economy were, by the 
1990s, the Maoists’ most powerful framing mechanism. They were the result of decades 
of economic mismanagement and political repression, especially under the Panchayat 
system of 1962 to 1990. “Nepal, which had the highest agricultural yield (per hectare) in 
South Asia in the early 1960s, fell significantly behind other countries by the early 
1990s.”54 A balance of payments crisis in the early 1980s amplified the problems caused 
by nonexistent agricultural productivity growth. Import substitution was largely to blame. 
As a result of rapidly increasing importation of raw goods and equipment for ISI, foreign 
currency reserves quickly shrank; when foreign capital finally failed to cover these 
annual shortfalls, reserves disappeared, leading to a devaluation of the rupee in 1985.55 
As a result, in 1986 Nepal received structural adjustment credits from the World Bank. 
The loan was offered with conditions encouraging liberalization of trade policies and 
“effective management of public finances,” although it lacked price increases or cuts to 
fiscal budgets.56 
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In an effort to break its dependency on Indian raw and manufactured goods, in the 
late 1980s Nepal worked to expand trade across the Nepal-Tibet border. The result was a 
far-ranging blockade, as Delhi began to suspect that Nepal was giving Chinese goods 
preferential treatment—which India saw as intrinsically threatening to its security.57 “The 
resulting shortages, particularly of kerosene, imposed considerable hardship on Nepal and 
at first the general public tended to blame India alone.” This was not to last long, and 
soon public displeasure shifted to the government itself, fueling the movement to 
overthrow the Panchayat system. 
As a result of “the social impact of the government’s economic policies, a 
structural adjustment programme initiated in 1986, and the effects of the Indian trade 
embargo during 1989, Nepal entered the 1990s in economic and political crisis.”58 As 
Figure 2 below illustrates, inflationary pressures were near double digits for most of the 
late 1970s through the early 1990s, and GDP growth remained unstable at best, although 
in the 1990s GDP growth never dipped below zero. 
World-Systemic Opening: IMF and World Bank Involvement 
While the 1950s and 1960s saw foreign aid to Nepal in the form of development 
grants, which stemmed from Nepal’s geopolitical importance at the time, such assistance 
decreased substantially as regional tension waned. At that point, “loans and the role of 
international agencies such as…the World Bank became more important.”60 Nonetheless, 
many investment projects—even those designed outside the exclusionist Nepali political 
system—failed to have a positive effect on employment outside the Terai and the 
Kathmandu Valley. Furthermore, the dependence of these jobs on materials and other 
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Figure 2: Graph of annual percent rate of GDP growth and of inflation (GDP Deflator) in Nepal between 
1961, the year before the Panchayat system was founded, and 1997, the first full year of the Maoist 
Revolution.59 It is important to note that, while the implementation of Structural Adjustment Loans appear 
to have had a positive effect on aggregate growth, inflation remained a large problem for the economy. 
 
capital from abroad made industries targeted by World Bank loans counterproductively 
capital-intensive.61 
Following the 1985 BOP crisis and devaluation, the Bank’s involvement in the 
Nepali economy increased in 1986 with Structural Adjustment Loan I (SAL I). The 
driving hope behind this loan was actually the mobilization of heightened political 
support; as a result, conditionality focused on “sound macroeconomic management, 
effective management of public finances, support for agriculture and light manufacturing, 
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liberalization of trade, and a start at reforming public enterprises” like Nepal’s import 
substitution industries. Three years later, SAL II came online, aiming “to consolidate and 
reinforce the earlier operation.” This time, the Bank ordered improvements to the tax 
system, the relatively closed financial sector, irrigation, and the handling of development 
funds. Totaling $60 million, the program succeeded to some degree in trade and financial 
liberalization.62 
“Despite the plethora of organisations now involved in aid at different levels, it 
was, of course, the major international bodies, in particular the World Bank and IMF, 
which had the greatest influence over the government’s general development policy and 
therefore had to share responsibility for developmental failure.”63 Furthermore, while 
SAL I and II were “certainly followed by a significant increase in GDP growth, both in 
agriculture and industry,” and were successful in addressing many BOP issues, it failed to 
adequately solve inflation, which had “appreciable” effects on the lives of the poor.64 
Revolution 
Prime Minister Deuba’s Commission on the Maoist insurgency described the 
revolutionary movement as “‘an expression of people’s dissatisfaction through 
violence…the outcome of defects in managing and handling statecraft and political 
instability…and the existing social discrimination, unemployment, and economic 
development.”65 Were this true—the evidence certainly indicates it was—the rural mid-
western districts of Rolpa and Rukum, along with their neighboring districts of Jajarkot, 
Salyan, Pyuthan, and Kalikot, would be a natural “epicenter of the Maoist movement.”66 
The mid-western hills are very remote and thus very poor; as a result, anti-establishment 
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support had been drummed up tirelessly there since the 1950s.67 Beginning “in 1995, the 
Maoists began a year-long campaign to build support among the peasants for initiating 
war” in these districts by organizing infrastructure-improvement programs and peasant 
groups.68 
On February 2, 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) delivered a Forty-
Point Manifesto in Kathmandu. Early in the document, the Maoists addressed economic 
issues, including “the domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business, and 
finance,” ineffective customs policy that would further the nation’s progress towards self-
reliance, and an end to “colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs.”69 These 
demands might draw also from Nepal’s experiences with the World Bank, which by its 
own admission had failed to incorporate local knowledge into SAL I and II.70 
Provided the Hinduized state of the previous two centuries, the Maoists also 
demanded social changes that stretched far beyond purely economic issues. “Nepal,” they 
insisted in Point 18, “should be declared a secular nation.” They railed against 
discrimination of both women and the “downtrodden and backward people,” ordering 
Hindu caste systems—and explicitly the concept of untouchability—extinguished.71 
Violence broke out days after the release of the Manifesto.72 For the next few 
years, conflict took the form of raids on isolated police stations in rural regions “weakly 
penetrated by the Nepalese state.73 King Birenda had refused to deploy the Royal Nepal 
Army in these early stages for a variety of reasons, perhaps in hope of discrediting the 
politicians who had gained power at his expense in 1990.74 While their tactics would 
remain the same, on September 25, 2000, the Maoists changed the conflict’s intensity. A 
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Maoist attack on the state police’s headquarters for the “inaccessible district of Dolpa” 
resulted in the death of 14 government personnel. Within the year, “the Maoists had 
gained almost total control of five mid-western hill districts.”75 
A greater blow to the state soon arose in completely unexpected fashion. On June 
1, 2001, Crown Prince Dipendra, “not only tipsy from whiskey but also high on ‘a special 
kind of cigarette prepared with a mixture of hashish and another unnamed black 
substance’” returned to a royal family banquet in military fatigues and bearing a small 
arsenal of weapons. He soon opened fire, killing ten members of the royal family: his 
mother; his father, King Birenda; his brother, the second in line to the throne; and, two 
days after the massacre, himself, now King Dipendra, from a self-inflicted head wound. 
Upon Dipendra’s death, his uncle Gyanendra ascended the throne.76 
The more conservative, less popular Gyanendra intensified efforts at rooting out 
the Maoists. On November 26, after classifying the CPN(M) a terrorist group, Gyanendra 
declared a state of emergency and deployed the Royal Nepal Army to fight the 
revolutionary forces. Over the next three-plus years, Gyanendra dismissed, reappointed, 
and again dismissed the government of Prime Minister Deuba before seizing absolute 
power himself on February 1, 2005, in what became known as “the royal coup.”77 
Gyanendra’s seizure of power aimed to solve Nepal’s socio-political crisis 
through the establishment of “a semblance of order,” which his advisors felt would 
answer decades of frustration despite its destruction of democratic rights. They were 
wrong, and their miscalculation alienated even the king’s longest allies. Despite 
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increasing public outrage, Gyanendra continued his “backwards” march toward “a variant 
of Panchayat-era political engagements.”78 
In November 2005, the CPN(M) joined forces with the parliamentary Seven Party 
Alliance (SPA). In their “Letter of Understanding,” both groups called for an end to 
“autocratic monarchy,” which was only to be replaced by “absolute democracy.”79 
Together they announced a four-day strike across Nepal, beginning on April 6, 2006. 
After a “lukewarm beginning, reports of violent suppression and killings of protestors 
drove the strike into a weeks long protest, ultimately pressuring the king to restore 
parliament on April 26.80 Within a month, the newly established body had placed limits 
on the monarchy, secularized the formerly Hindu state, and began talks which led to the 
inclusion of the Maoists in an interim government.81 
The Maoists, however, continued to gain influence—only now this was done via 
ballots rather than bullets. “In May 2008, Maoists unexpectedly won a plurality in the 
first assembly elections.”82 Now in control, they alerted Gyanendra on May 29, 2008, that 
within fifteen days he was to abdicate, ending the world’s last Hindu monarchy and 
transforming Nepal into a republic.83 
The Maoists’ revolution still grinds on, like the Russian and Mexican ones before 
it. Disputes over the makeup of the Nepalese military led the Maoists to quit the interim 
government in 2009. Since then, they have sparked demonstrations and attempted to 
enact policy autonomously.84 With the interim constitution set to expire on May 28, 2010, 
the future for Nepal is uncertain, with more struggles to come.85 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
The preceding case studies suggest that institutions can and do have a profound 
impact in the lives of states. As a crucial source of funds, the IMF and the World Bank 
act as critical care for states whose political, economic, and social structures have grown 
obsolete. Just as revolutions are not some quick momentary occurrence traceable to a 
single day, month, or year, it appears that the involvement of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions is not limited to a single factor or policy; rather, their participation in a state 
affects numerous steps on the path to revolution. The IMF and World Bank have long 
lasting repercussions that make it difficult to determine where their influence begins and 
where it ends. 
The previous three chapters have sought to demonstrate Skocpol’s claim that 
“unique to social revolution is that basic changes in social structure and political 
structure occur together in mutually reinforcing fashion.”1 They have illustrated 
revolutions as processes rooted in flawed structures, as exercises that require time and 
countless variables to reach their end. Each state in the study has experienced 
widespread, multilevel dependent development; an exclusionist, repressive state; cultures 
of opposition; and economic downturn. While IMF and World Bank involvement has 
been viewed primarily as composing a world-systemic opening, their inclusion in many 
of the other categories in each case study suggests that their involvement is much more 
pervasive, unable to be defined under just one dynamic. 
IFI involvement had a rather powerful role in dependent development, creating 
inter-class resentment that fueled the grievances of the lower or disenfranchised classes. 
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In South Africa, blacks failed to receive an increase in their real wages for nearly six 
decades,2 while IMF-backed white South Africa ascended into the First World—an 
economy held up as the example of growth and progress on the African continent.3 In 
Nepal, similarly, many redevelopment funds went to projects that benefitted political 
elites, the wealthy, or other members of privileged ethno-caste groups.4 While aggregate 
growth remained high and received praise, on the ground in rural districts, where the vast 
majority of Nepalese live, crushing poverty had become entrenched. Urban areas, where 
political elites lived among a far, far smaller fraction of the state’s population, received a 
preponderance of international aid. Nicaraguan elites, especially the Somozas, benefited 
from foreign funding that fueled agro-export in the form of credit for cash crops.  
The repercussions of these events were not immediately evident. The blatant 
successes of elite groups, viewed from below in the light of devastating penury, sparked 
inter-class hatred and fed the building of grievances. Furthermore, as these elites 
benefited from the support the Bretton Woods Institutions provided their states, the state 
had a decreasing need to be accountable, distancing public opinion and the desires of the 
vast majority of the population from the state’s decision making, following the dynamic 
suggested by Foran.5 As a result, antiquated and unpopular political structures continued 
to thrive. In all these cases, assistance furthered the dependence of each of these states on 
the international financial aid and capricious foreign markets. 
By financially supporting and, in essence, legitimizing repressive, inefficient, and 
often flagrantly violent regimes, the most pertinent results of the IMF and World Bank’s 
activities in the states studied above were the perpetuation of antiquated and inhuman 
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state structures. Only this explains how a state with incredible budget problems, high 
inflation, and a brutally repressed and disenfranchised majority could persist as long as 
South Africa under National Party rule did. This was the primary reason that so many of 
the Fund’s executive directors protested the $1.1 billion loan of the early 1980s. Often, 
state-saving resources were provided to these unjust states in the name of protecting 
investment and maintaining economic stability; yet, measures that would have crippled 
the political efficacy of these regimes, each of which during the Cold War had important 
geo-political positions, were very rarely enforced or suggested.  
In contrast to what the literature suggests, these case studies found limited direct 
effect from the IMF and World Bank on the formation of cultures of political opposition. 
While evidence exists of public outrage over IFI policies and distrust of their motives, as 
in Nqakula’s comments on the IFIs, it is difficult to ascertain just how far-reaching the 
influence of such thought was. While it certainly shaped the political-economic thinking 
of the ANC, the role of this viewpoint in mobilizing the masses seems highly limited. 
Instead, cultures of opposition seem to stem from secondary or tertiary results of IMF and 
World Bank intrusion or from outright Western interference in domestic affairs. While 
Nicaragua’s World Bank-backed credit system led to elite organization and provided a 
means by which the FSLN could present their struggle in a positive light to the economic 
elites, their appeals likely were not made directly to the planters’ disdain, if any even 
existed, for the World Bank. Instead, they were targeted at the corrupt and inefficient 
Somozan economic system. 
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The World Bank and the IMF had similar influence on the economic downturns 
each of these three states experienced. Many of South Africa’s economic issues stemmed 
from the inefficiencies of apartheid, its impact on the labor market, lost investment due to 
political unrest, or the massive amount of defense spending required to repress over 80 
percent of a teeming population. While IFI policies did not harm South Africa’s economy 
directly, they did hasten the economy’s struggles, by legitimizing the regime and by 
essentially funding its violent tactics.6 On the other hand, in Nicaragua and Nepal, the 
promotion of and rapid conversion to agro-export sparked a huge rise in homelessness 
and landlessness, putting an unexpected burden on the states and peoples in question as 
the rural unemployed moved to slums and into revolutionary cadres. 
This study acknowledged and searched for Foran’s three factors in a revolution: 
“political change, structural transformation, and mass participation.”7 While initially the 
study looked for the ability of IFI involvement to incite mass participation—as the 
population became angered over lower real wages, cuts in government services, and 
general recession—and through political and structural change, the case studies suggest 
that the dynamic involved is more nuanced and complex, often occurring through a 
finance cut or poor, uninformed advising. 
In Nicaragua and South Africa, the sudden withdrawal of crucial financial support 
had devastating ramifications for each state’s ability to control its opposition. 
Specifically, in Nicaragua, the end of funding greatly limited the amount of credit 
extended to wealthy farmers. Already disenchanted with the government’s moral and 
political shortcomings—as well as with their own prospects for financial success as civil 
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war spread and Somozan malfeasance continued—the elites shifted their support to the 
FSLN in June 1979. Likewise, the sudden stop of funding to apartheid South Africa 
following the Gramm Amendment began to weaken the resolve of the National Party 
government, ultimately bringing it to the negotiating table.8 
More than conditionality or a rapid decrease in foreign aid, Nepal suffered from 
loans that lacked oversight and proper advising. Funds simply were doled out without 
assurance they were designed to achieve their goals. Whelpton found that many projects 
were viewed by the poor as solely benefitting the wealthy, who, unlike the poor, did none 
of the labor required for their implementation.9 Additionally, even the World Bank 
Group’s own Independent Evaluation Group found that the design of SAL I and II lacked 
local knowledge of the situation within Nepal.10 
As mentioned, the collapse of the Sandinista government after roughly nine years 
in power provides further evidence that a cutoff of international funding may prove more 
beneficial to a revolutionary movement than conditionality. Such a cutoff constitutes a 
world-systemic opening: a withdrawal of support from the international community, 
especially from the economic and military powers that hold the majority of the IFIs’ 
votes. While conditionality can force a let-up within the state by limiting the resources 
available to fund repression, cutoffs additionally destroy any hope of emergency support 
for the old regime from the international community. Both the Somozan and Sandinista 
states avoided severe conditionality. Their cases illustrate the need for aid in dependently 
developing states for economic development to occur on any level. The fact that the 
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conditionality imposed on Nicaragua in 1991 failed to spark another social revolution—
or even a regime change—seems to support this conclusion. 
Beyond the actual funds provided by the IMF, the relationship between the Fund 
and the National Party’s South Africa bolstered the National Party government, 
encouraging military and police spending, legitimizing the regime in the developed 
world, and in effect acting as a counter-revolutionary influence. Indeed, the ability of 
IMF loans to assuage the fears of foreign private lenders following Sharpeville and the 
Soweto riots bestowed a degree of political legitimacy on Pretoria.11 While so reactionary 
a side of IMF involvement is not wholly shocking—one of its goals, from a financial 
standpoint, should be to encourage the stability that investors seek—the fact remains that 
“the IMF played an important role in staving off the imminent crisis in the South African 
political economy.”12 
In these case studies, there forms a picture of the IMF and World Bank as 
attempting to foster development at all costs, usually hand-in-hand with ensuring that 
foreign investment is promoted and protected. In apartheid South Africa, rates of return 
were some of the highest in the world; but without IMF backing of South Africa through 
numerous loans despite apartheid’s wrongs, it is unlikely those investments would have 
occurred. Loans were continually offered to Nepal despite highly limited results where 
they were needed most, although aggregate growth was substantial; the same might be 
said for Nicaragua. Such behavior reinforces claims in the literature that the Bretton 
Woods Institutions—by working to establish political, economic, and social stability—
enact policies that primarily favor their shareholders. Many of the investments such 
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measures aim to protect come from Western, industrial economies. As these hold most of 
the power in the IFIs, their focus on minimizing risk to investment—regardless of 
crushing poverty, murderous oppression, and flagrant corruption—place Western 
interests ahead of those of recipient nations. 
While the examples of these three revolutions cannot support the claim that 
conditionality encourages revolutionary processes, they cannot necessarily deny it, either. 
When given the choice between international economic growth or stability and seemingly 
locally contained inefficiencies or injustices, the IMF and World Bank, in this study, 
often chose the former. Conditionality was thus too rare to be given any blame in the 
context of Nepal, Nicaragua, and South Africa; but it was also too rare to conclude it has 
no role in revolution elsewhere in the developing world. Rather than through a single 
aspect of their behavior, the IMF and the World Bank influence the lives of states via 
numerous channels. From ill-fitted policy advice or crippling cuts in financial assistance 
to the counter-revolutionary support of obsolete states in the form of conditionless loans 
and legitimization, they profoundly affect revolutions in the developing world. 
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